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ABSTRACT 
This assignment grapples with ethical aspects concerning those disabled, 'abnormal', visibly 
different living in a Procrustean society where to be visibly different is to be marginalised. In 
the first section, creating narratives, I introduce the reader to The Elephant Man, Joseph 
Merrick. The purpose of this introduction is to create a bond between the reader and the 
disfigured subject, to give a human face to one who is deformed. In the second section I place 
Merrick, deformed and disabled, in the status quo position of the slippery slope argument: we 
prohibit the killing of deformed or disabled members of our society. But are there any reasons 
why this position should be maintained? To answer this question I pivot the arguments of 
Professor Peter Singer, challenging this position and identify complaints rising from disabled 
agents concerning his hiring by Princeton University. Because the emotional arguments focus 
on the claim that if the acceptance of Singer's stance is accepted, then the result will be 
eugenics, personified in another Holocaust, I explore the eugenics movement. Finally, I 
conclude that Singer does not advocate the killing of disabled humans who live their lives in 
accordance to their wishes. Yet, I caution that to avoid the final moral degradation in the 
emotive form of the slippery slope argument we must realise with Foucault: "My point is not 
that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not the same as being bad. If 
everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to 
apathy but to a hyper and pessimistic activism." 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie opdrag worstel met die etiese aspekte aangaande die kwessie van diegene wat 
gestremd, abnormaal en sigbaar verskillend lyk, maar wat leef in 'n Procrustiaanse 
samelewing waar diegene wat duidelik verskillend is, gemarginaliseer word. In die eerste deel 
van die opdrag stel ek die leser bekend aan die Olifantman (The Elephant Man), Joseph 
Merrick. Die doel van hierdie inleiding is om 'n band te smee tussen die leser en die 
misvormde (verminkte) subjek, met die doel om 'n menslike gesig te gee aan die misvormde 
individu. In die tweede deel plaas ek 'n misvormde en gebreklike Merrick in die status quo 
posisie van die slippery slope-argument, naamlik dat ons die doodmaak van misvormde en 
gestremde lede van die samelewing verbied. Is daar egter enige redes waarom hierdie posisie 
gehandhaaf behoort te word? In antwoord op hierdie vraag, fokus ek op die argumente van 
Peter Singer, daag ek in die proses sy posisie uit en identifiseer klagtes wat na yore gebring is 
deur gestremde individue, na aanleiding van sy aanstelling by die Universiteit van Princeton. 
Die emosionele argumente fokus op die aanspraak dat eugenetika of rasverbetering die gevolg 
sal wees indien Singer se posisie aanvaar word. In die lig van hierdie argumente ondersoek ek 
dus die eugenetiese beweging. My gevolgtrekking is dat Singer nie voorstel dat gestremde 
mense wat hulle lewe volgens hulle eie wense lewe, doodgemaak word nie. Om egter die 
finale morele degradasie, in die emotiewe vorm van die slippery slope-argument, te vermy, 
moet ons saam met Foucault besef: "My pOint is not that everything is bad, but that 
everything is dangerous, which is not the same as being bad If everything is dangerous, then 
we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper and 
pessimistic activism. " 
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SECTION ONE 
VISIBLE DIFFERENCE 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Finally, between Eleusis and Athens, Theseus met the brigand Procrustes who 
possessed a hammer, a saw and a bed He compelled travellers to lie on the bed, and 
those who were too long Jar it he would cut down to size those who were too short he 
would hammer out until they fit it exactly. He too perished at Thesus' hand in the way 
he had killed his victims". -Morford and Learndon: 1996: 459 
Procrustes, conjectured by Donley and Buckley (1996: 1) serves as the exemplary 
'tyrant of the normal' (Fielder: 1978: 2)- fitting people into societal standards of the 
body normal. However, in the example of Procrustes there is only one type of 
enforcement of 'normalcy', namely that of height. Yet, the differences in people 
categorised as 'disabled' are as vast as the differences in the type of social, physical 
and psychological handicaps they have. And the differences in the type of handicap 
reflects conversely on the way in which society evokes its response to them, and thus, 
effects their responses to society. In addition, particular societies, in particular 
historical periods may also evoke distinctive patterning. It seems that we, (who are 
relatively 'normal') even close to the twenty-first century, seem to have a need to see 
ugly ducklings transformed into beautiful swans and wrinkled toads become smooth 
and dashing princes. In fact, we seem to believe that such 'deviants' should somehow 
make these changes, and if they cannot be made our tendency is to cast them out. 
We can cast out afflictions through a variety of means as the human genome project 
brings with it, among other things, the ability to make abnormal people more like us, 
to 'fix' abnormal genes, to elicit genetic engineering, growth hormones, in-utero 
surgery and so on. Our ability to make people convenient to societal standards is far 
ahead of our contemplating about who decides what is abnormal and what is normal, 
who decides whether normalising is the best thing to do, who has the right and 
authority to make any of the possible changes and, of course, financial boundaries. 
Society works as a tool controlling human differences and change occurs in response 
to the biomedical technology available plus cultural wishes, values and desires. With 
advanced technologies come additional ethical issues. For example, biotechnology 
gives us the opportunity of knowing if a fetus is abnormal, and we can opt to have or 
not have an abortion, raising a spectrum of ethical issues. Adding more complications 
1 
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to the (already complicated) issue of abortion, insurance companies may threaten to 
refuse to pay for care if an infant is born with a known abnormal 'pre-existing' 
condition (Donley and Buckley: 1996: xi). Those infants. who slip through the 
industrialised technological network and by chance are born defective also present us 
with choices. For those born with birth defects of such an extent that they are not 
expected to live (with even the, most aggressive and sophisticated interventions) the 
probable quality of their lives is assessed and basically two moral options are argued: 
use all available means to keep them alive, or let them die painlessly (Kluge: 
1998:242-249). Infants born with relatively 'minor' defects ('relatively' and 'minor' 
being entirely subjective) present their own ethical sets of questions. The idea of a 
disabled infant, 'socially nonviable' also relies largely upon ~istorically variable. 
values as opposed to technological precepts only. Factors involved in decision making 
concerning 'adjustments' may include family and individual demands for services, the 
desire to prevent people from being unproductive 'drains' on society, or working in a 
general perceived mandate to 'protect the aesthetic standards of the culture'. 
WRITING THE FACE OF DIFFERENCE 
How does one write the grossly disfigured face, the deformed body, and the bearer of 
Visible Difference? As Edgerton (1973: 124) writes, " There is no simple equation that 
exists for calculating the impact of the outer man on the inner; or the impact of a 
deformed body upon soul, no matter how such concepts might or ought to be used in 
modern medicine." Indeed, in calculating the impact of the outer man on the inner 
there is also a complex correlation between what one desires to say and the selection 
of a genre or form in which to say it. In writing traditional ethical textbooks, for 
example, a current popular genre is the case study. 
Case studies are of course adaptations of narrative form. Through exploring case 
studies, case discussions and case methods, it is argued that the reader best learns in 
general how to connect insights to "appropriate sets of concepts, principles, and 
theories that control the selection and analysis of cases"(Beauchamp and Childress: 
1994: 99). To use other forms, such as those 'literary' in the teaching of ethics, some 
philosophers argue results in an unwelcome situation where the ethical point is 
obscured. After all, the exercise is to argue clearly, consistently, logically, and well 
one's point. To illustrate this, let us look at the format of many case studies used: 
2 
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Mr x., institutionalised, is severely disabled to the extent that he cannot even sleep in 
a supine position. He is aware that if he lies in this position he will die. He asked, and 
was infonned by his physician that there is no cure for his disease. One day he is 
found dead on his bed, in a supine position. No foul play is indicated. 
From this case study, we could argue points such as allocation of resources, asking 
should or should not society bear the cost of maintaining severely handicapped 
persons. Or we could raise the issue of competence (making reference to classic cases 
such as Cruzen and Casey, for our case studies are, by and large, contextually placed 
in wealthy industrialised democratic societies with legal and health care 
infrastructures well in place). In considering the ethical aspects of competence, we 
would ask if the physician carefully justified the many values used in detennining 
competence. Perhaps we could also discuss if the physician should have referred Mr. 
X. for psychiatric evaluation as possibly suicidal. Considering suicide, we could argue 
pro or con the moral justifiability of suicide, tracing the arguments for, example from 
Seneca (4 -65 CE) to contemporary times. The list is not meant to be exhaustive. 
While there are both positive and negative arguments concerning the use of case 
studies in the teaching of ethics (Banks: 1996:76), the objective of this paper is not to 
repudiate or discredit their use. From the simple fonnat of case studies, ethical topics 
may be easy to extrapolate. And certainly, there are certain advantages to clinging to 
straight clear case studies: they remove us from the messy world of complexity and 
allow us to detach- to live in a world simpler, logical, and deducible. 
Yet, I always seem to feel that there is something missing. Indeed, many case studies 
appear out of touch when faced with applying ethics on the ground level. What is 
missing, is the complex and very human face of medicine's sub-text, a suffering 
patient who demands expression. Am I arguing that case studies should be tossed out 
of ethical teaching? No, for there is a legitimate place for them. My suggestion is that 
creative fonns such as literature, art, film, and dance add special and broader 
dimensions to the teaching of ethics and their use should be added to teaching 
curriculum. At the same time, in a class room situation, I suggest that if a literary 
work is read alone (a film viewed alone, an artwork viewed alone), then these 
3 
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parameters may thwart the mutuality and exchanges necessary to enhance the 
philosophical conversation (Nussbaum: 1990: 240). 
With Nussbaum (ibid: 3), I agree that very often the expression of humanity, the face 
of humanity cannot be identified within the "expositional structure conventional to 
philosophy", but may better be articulated through a good story: a story that holds the 
power to awaken us to the humanity in others and the humanity in ourselves, so that 
the ideological difference between 'them' and 'us' becomes unimportant. 
4 
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SCOPE OF THIS SECTION 
In the first section of this paper, I will demonstrate that art forms, such as literature, 
open the traditional boundaries of ethics allowing the reader to engage· in a broader 
ethical u~derstanding. Emphasised is a particular priority granted to agents, actions, 
and the role of emotions in deliberations and self-knowledge (Nussbaum: 1990: 3). I 
suggest that narrative drama is an interesting and viable addition to the use of case 
studies and in this commentary as a whole, argue a case for literature as a healing art. 
"There are stories", write Graham and Oehlschlaeger (1992: 1) "so compelling that 
they resist closure, so richly suggestive that they defy containment." Such stories 
persist and change independent of the individuals that have lived their reality or 
contrived their fictions. Indeed, although they may inspire enduring poetry, prose, 
music and art their own durability has comparatively little to do with the particular 
works presenting them. These stories live on in us probably because we read 
ourselves in them, in both crooked and straight ways. The 'truths' they proclaim and 
the situations they prospect are primordial, but each new age, each new interpretation 
adds facts and figures, and variants to the archetypal catalogue. The evidence for such 
a claim is that, having pierced the bounds of fiction or fact, they proceed to evolve 
and inspire, to recreate themselves in a diversity of modes. 
Such is the story of The Elephant Man, the tale of Joseph Carey Merrick. It is the 
telling of a self imprisoned in a body being continuously and grotesquely remade 
through a cause neither he nor medical experts at the time could neither contain nor 
comprehend. Yet, he faced daily what every human being in any time growing old or 
infirmed, permanently maimed or disfigured faces: the exclusion from the world of 
those healthy and 'normal'. His personal dilemma, of whether to accept his blighted 
body as an attribute of his personal identity or reject it as a misleading masquerade, 
remains the same of those disabled in today's world. Like Merrick, those who suffer 
visible difference articulate painful questions of cause and effect, personal guilt or the 
cruelty of the cosmos. 
People with disabilities, as Robert Murphy (1995:140-158) explains, suffer a 
"contamination of identity". Their conditions are understood to be embedded within 
the very fabric of their physical and moral personhood. The reflections of their 
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disability are mirrored in the eyes of society by situating the disabled person apart, as 
one who harbours more than just a physical/cognitive limitation or difference. It 
infuses every aspect of his or her social being and creates a tautological link between 
biology and self that cannot be unmoored. Living in the physical world provides the 
material evidence of an inner life (polluted or virtuous) that remains fastened by the 
imprint of visible difference. Present within the many writings concerning people 
born with or having acquired defects, and particularly present within those disabled 
writers, repeatedly rises the fear of total societal exclusion (Donley & Buckley: 1996). 
Using the genre of literature as a vehicle, in this section I re-interpret interpretations 
and create anew a dialogue of some ethical considerations rising when interacting 
with those visibly different. I use the example of Joseph Carey Merrick, son of Joseph 
Rockley Merrick, Warehouseman, and Mary Jane Merrick, nee Potterton, born in 
Leicester UK, August 5, 1862 (Howell & Ford: 1980), known in plays, songs, 
narratives, poetry, medical digests, films and art as, "The Elephant Man n. 
It is the purpose of this section to show that disease, deformity and even identity are in 
part social constructs, mutable expressions of cultural and personal values. The 
Elephant Man, in literature, shows deep mythic truths, a story incredibly familiar that 
underpins many of our most enduring questions: Who are we? Where did we come 
from? Why are we here? What is it to be 'human'? 
6 
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MENS SANA IN CORPORE SAND 
-Juvenal, 151 Century AD 
From the time of the ancient Greeks, the aesthetic body corporeal was of great 
importance. Plato, in Symposium 201 (63:93-98) says, " The deformed is always 
inharmonious with the divine and the beautiful harmonious ... for (man) in deformity 
will beget nothing and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body 
above all as he finds there a fair and noble and well-nourished soul. " Further, Plato 
concludes, that the ascension of the soul could be hampered if constrained within a 
weak physical body or a congenital defect. 
The Romans carried with them similar thoughts believing, as Cicero put it " It matters 
greatly to the soul by what sort of body it is placed; for there are many conditions of 
the body that sharpen the mind, and many that blunt it" (Cicero, quoted in Carey: 
1989: 261). The presence of deformity and its relation to Godliness also was a 
concern of the early church. It was debated hotly whether deformed individuals were 
capable of resurrection and, as St. Anthony put it, even possessed "reasonable souls". 
St. Gregory took this position further saying that deformities must be understood as 
"sins"- contra naturam. He took a stand and forbid those deformed to become 
members of the clergy because " a man who is ravaged by his own sins, cannot 
expiate the sins of others" (Carey: 1996: 31). 
Those ordinary deformed people, who by chance survived the then common practice 
of infanticide, were denied the sacraments. The point is, holiness was equated with 
those beautiful; God was not to be defiled by those with corporeal imperfections, no 
matter how sincerely they might profess their faith. Such arguments with their 
implicit and explicit assumptions about the aesthetic body centre around the image of 
God and man- imago Dei et hominis- as the earlier assumptions focused on the soul's 
or character's relationship to a comely body. 
In 18th century England the traditionally "reliable church as an immensely powerful 
ideological form was in big trouble" (Eagleton: 1994:44). Attendance waned and as 
the masses turned from the church there evolved a subtle (but not entirely erased) shift 
from the emphasis of deformity being considered a 'sin' on the part of the mother or 
the defonned child to deformity as a consequence of maternal imagination. Interest in 
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monstrosities has been present throughout all human history. Its fevered pitch was 
perhaps most evident throughout the 17th and 18th centuries in England. "From the 
highest to the lowest" the English were so " fond of sights and monsters, and liberal in 
rewarding those who shew them" (Todd: 1995:5). The particularly enthusiastic 
response to those monstrous, according to Todd (ibid: 107) was grounded in the 
unsettled nature of the Victorian notion of self-identity: "muddled in uncertainties and 
vexations largely because people feared their bodies excised a prominent but infinite 
power, one that called into question the integrity of the self". 
BRIEFLY, HISTORICAL FACTS OF MERRICK'S LIFE UP TO THE TIME OF HIS 
REUNION WITH MR. TREVES 
From birth Joseph Merrick's head, right arm and feet were larger than normal. As. a 
child, much of his skin became thickened, loose, and rough and, according to his 
family, at the age of about one and a half years, Merrick began to develop tumours 
(Montagu: 1971: 110). In spite of these afflictions, Merrick was schooled until the 
age of twelve (Graham and Oehlschlaeger: 1992: 158). Joseph's mother gave 'Carey' 
as a middle name. She did this to honour a famous Baptist missionary, William Carey 
(1761-1834), who influenced greatly her life. Merrick was also a devoted Christian. 
After difficulties faced with employment because of his deformities (ibid: 159), he 
worked for his father delivering coal, in a cigar factory, and as a hawker to the lower 
working class area called Whitechapel-road, London. 
Following the death of his mother from bronchopneumonia on May 19, 1873, his 
f~ther remarried his landlady (Howell and Ford: 1980: 113). After Merrick's 
disabilities became too pronounced his relationship with both father and stepmother 
deteriorated, as he was no longer able to assist the family (Graham and Oehlschlaeger: 
1992: 158). He entered one of London's institutions, the Leicester Union Workhouse 
(Howell and Ford: 1980: 89). In the Workhouse his worsening condition and the 
problems encountered with 'normal' others became so pronounced that Merrick 
initiated contact with a "vendor of curiosities", Mr. Sam Toor (ibid: 169). 
He was exhibited throughout London, as well as in Whitechapel-road where he lived 
in a 'small room warmed only with a brick heated by a lamp' (ibid: 105). It was in this 
small room, painted primitively with scenes of jungles and exoticism that Mr. Treves, 
8 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
a then young surgeon attached to London Hospital, first met "The Elephant Man", 
Joseph Merrick. Following his first private exhibition to Treves, he was engaged by 
him to be exhibited as a 'case' to the London Pathological Society on December 2, 
1884. The medical establishment wrote articles concerning his condition published in 
the British Medical Journal (Montagu: 1971: appendices 1-8). Although Treves hoped 
. Merrick to be an imbecile, Merrick proved him wrong. A relationship was established 
between the two men then they parted company. In the following two years, Merrick 
toured as a spectacle with a variety of 'freak' shows in England and the Continent. In 
Belgium he was robbed of his savings by his Austrian manager, had a most difficult 
passage but finally returned to London. It was at this juncture that the two men met 
agam. 
From this point, I add a creative edition to the story of Joseph Carey Merrick, 
incorporating some aspects of near-millennium medical ethical issues concerning 
people not like us, those visibly different. 
9 
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MERRICK RETURNS TO LONDON 
"No!" he cried. "I am not an elephant! 1 am not a beast! 1 am a human being! 1- am- a-
man! 1 AM A MAN! " It was as if his scream of self-articulation drained him of his 
last resources, for Merrick then collapsed, sobbing against the urinal's walls of 
London's Liverpool Street Station. The crowd remained, still fevered by the race to 
ritualistically purify their now-polluted world. Take away the unholy, the 
contaminated, and the abominations; excise this intruder from our sanctuary of 
normalcy. Destroy such monstrous antagonists who cause us to question our society, 
and our very concept of self. What we cannot name, we cannot own. What we cannot 
comprehend, we must destroy. 
Yet, from the mulling crowd, a woman I walked towards Merrick, bent and placed a 
hand on his shoulder. "Card, pocket", said Merrick. However, the woman could not 
understand his words as Merrick's speech was slurred from both exhaustion and his 
physical condition. "Again, say the words again," 2 said the woman. "Card, there" 
Merrick said slowly, gesturing to his pocket painfully with his functioning left ami. 
The visiting card, dirty and much-thumbed, was retrieved and read: " Mr. Frederick 
Treves, Surgeon. Rooms: London Hospital n. 
"This card, dear God" Treves uttered when it was delivered. "It has been two years 
since 1 last saw him." It took Treves twenty minutes to reach London Station. 
Rushing, pushing, flaying his arms through the crowd he screamed, "Move on, out of 
the way, clear away" until he stood, gowned still in his black surgical coat stiff with 
blood, in front of the collapsed shrouded figure. Treves went down to the floor, his 
back to the now dwindling crowd. "Help me by holding his shoulders" he said to the· 
woman, "while 1 raise his head". This was done. It was as if time had stopped and 
another world was entered. No noise. No people. No time. "John", he said quietly. 
"Mr. Treves, Mr. Treves" Joseph sobbed. The woman said, "Do you know him?" " 
Yes," said Treves with tears flowing, "I know him well, he is my friend." "Then 1 take 
my leave" she said and faded from view. 
10 
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SANCTUARY 
A temporary place was found in the overcrowded London general hospital for 
Merrick. Mr. F. C. Carr Gomm, the hospital Chairman made a public appeal for 
Merrick's support in the London Times published December 4, 1886(Montagu: 
1971: 58). This was because repeated requests to the hospital board for his 
accommodation was to no avail. 
In his letter, Carr Gomm urges to public the support separate quarters from 
Merrick in hospital because, "his appearance is so dreadful that he is unable to 
come out by daylight to the garden ... is such that all shrink from him ... he cannot, 
in all justice to others, be put in the general ward of a workhouse, and from such, 
even if possible, he shrinks with the greatest horror" (ibid: 59). 
Carr Gomm, according to authors Graham and Oehlschlaeger (1992: 19) was the 
first interpreter of Merrick to describe some of the paradoxes that have become 
staples in the subsequent reinterpretations of Merrick's story. Such paradoxes 
appear as: despite the terror he produces in being seen by others ("particularly 
women and nervous persons who fly in terror of him" [Montagu: 1971: 60]) he is 
" superior in intelligence can read and write, is quiet, gentle, not to say even 
refined in his mind"(ibid). While he shrinks from others, others shrink from him; 
while he must be protected from others, others must be protected from him. 
Merrick's hobby or habit of making cardboard models with his one functioning 
hand and sending them to those who had shown kindness to him (Graham and 
Oehlschlaeger: 1992: 19) was also explained by Carr Gomm: industry and 
benevolence persist against great odds. Merrick, so presented, is blameless of his 
responsibility for being deformed and is described "as a case of singular affliction 
brought about through no fault of himself" (ibid: 20). Carr Gomm was the first to 
present Merrick's condition as worthy of charity based on a theological appeal. He 
wrote: 
" The Master of the Temple on Advent Sunday preached an eloquent sermon on' 
the subject of our Master's answer to the question, 'Who did sin, the man or his 
parents that he was born blind?' "(ibid: 61) showing why the Creator, in 
permitting a man to be born to a life of hopelessness and misery, was that the 
11 
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works of God should be manifested in evoking the sympathy and kindly aid of 
those on whom such a heavy cross is not laid (ibid). In the passage quoted (John 
9: 1-3) Jesus answers, "Neither has this man sinned, nor his parents", and implies 
the separation of sin from disease, the timeless custom of equating illness or 
deformity with divine punishment. Carr Gomrn's theology shifts the freeing sense 
of the text and releases both Merrick and his parents, particularly his mother, from 
responsibility foj· Merrick's disorder. In the same way, in a sense, Merrick's story 
of his mother being struck down by an elephant while pregnant 3 frees both from 
responsibility. In addition, Carr Gomm establishes a different polarity between 
subject and object- those who give through charity and those who receive it 
(Graham and Oehlschlaeger: 1992:20). 
The appeal of Carr Gomrn proved fruitful and Merrick became a permanent 
resident of London Hospital. He was described as a person of great kindness, and 
imagination. Safely secluded from the world, Merrick was able to indulge in his 
particular loves: the theatre and reading. He became a Victorian cause celebre and 
was visited by many (for various motives 4 ) including the theatre's toast Mr. 
Kendal and royal personages such as the Princess of Wales and Edward VII. Yet: 
Treves remained his most constant companion, visiting him daily. Merrick's 
hobby, that of cardboard construction of models persisted, the most famous being 
the construction of St. Phillip's cathedral, seen from his window (and a central 
metaphor in many interpretations of Merrick's life [Pomerance: 1979]). We return 
to the room where Merrick and Treves are in conversation while working together 
on the construction of his latest model, a mountain. 
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SOCRATES, MEN AND THE MAKING OF A MOUNTAIN. 
"I have been reading about philosophy and medicine and the birth of children, Mr. 
Treves", said Merrick. "Wherever do you get such books?" asked Treves, his walrus 
moustache quivering. (And thinking, concerning children, how difficult it was to 
realise that Merrick, despite of his appearance, was a normal man, with normal sexual 
desires and just might imagine having a family. 5) "From the library of Mr. Carr 
Gomm, " replied Merrick "he lets me take from it whatever I wish." "I see", said 
Treves (thinking how utterly irresponsible it was of Mr. Carr Gomm to allow 
someone with no medical knowledge or philosophical background access to things 
they could not comprehend! 6 ) and what did you learn? "First, I learned that I have 
many questions to ask and no answers and secondly, I think everything we do seems 
to be relative to the time in which we live," replied Merrick. 
"Explain and ask as you will, and do hand me that square piece over there, this 
mountain isn't well shaped, with all these crags and chocks it looks like a jutting 
slope" said Treves. Merrick thought for a few moments and while glue and cardboard 
were arranged and re-arranged, began to speak. "The ancient Greeks, or perhaps the 
noble in their society tried not just to live, but to achieve a life in which beauty, 
honour and excellence were exemplified." 
"Yes, that's true," said Treves," best said by Socrates, 'The unexamined life is not 
worth living'. ,,7 "Well, Mr. Treves, did he mean that every life and death situation 
should be examined? Because he gives a criterion, but he doesn't say to whom it 
applies- I mean, to whom a certain life might not be worth living." "Oh dear," thought 
Treves, "he does come up ·with questions!" " I'm not a philosopher" replied Treves, 
"but perhaps Socrates meant that to him, or to all philosophers, that an unexamined 
life is not worth living. That would mean that he would rather die than give up his 
inquiry, which as you know, he did, John." "Yes, I considered that, but could it also 
mean that to force a person to live a life of inquiry makes such a life more satisfactory 
to Socrates himself, or if not to Socrates, to that of someone else, ·or society or the 
gods? Or perhaps if a life is not examined, then could that life be taken or lost without 
any grief we ought to feel, or even some P4nishment we might require for the death of 
non- inquiries into it?" 
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"Those are indeed interpretations", said Treves (a bit confused)," b~t John, to the 
point, what is it about the question that bothers you so? Are you examining your life? 
What have you been overhearing when you take your evening promenade in the 
garden?" "Much the same as I have heard all my life" said Merrick sadly, " that it 
would have been better if I had not been born ... that I should have been left to die at 
the time of my birth ... that I am an abomination. I even remember you, Mr. Treves, 
saying the first time we met that you hoped I was an imbecile for if I was an imbecile 
then you could carry on your life never to consider me again. What did you mean by 
that?" 8 
" Oh, John ", said Treves after a long delay, " It was just that you look so, er, your 
looks, your condition is so different- I and all my colleagues didn't and still don't 
know why you have this disease or how it works. (He stumbles over his words) I am a 
doctor, dedicated to curing ills, the challenge of things I do not know, things I can't 
contro I 9, I. .. " 
Merrick interrupts, "Mr. Treves, say it, my body is grotesque but on that body alone 
you made certain assumptions -that I must be backward, stupid or evil. You decided 
that my life was one of pain and misery, you felt, and I believe I know you know well 
enough to say, that it would have been best if I did not have a mind to think and 
dreams and imagination-best, that I would not be aware of how I look- of the things 
people do and said to me, maybe better ifl had not been allowed to live." 
"But", he muses, "were your remarks meant as kindness? My life, as a 'freak', you 
must have compared to yours as a 'normal' and could not envision that within such a 
carcass there could be a person, what type of life that person has, and what that person 
thinks about the quality of his or her own life. I think you saw me as a species of 
Homo sapiens, but not as a person capable of physical sensibility or some level of 
awareness. But, you didn't really look, Mr. Treves, because if you had, on the day that 
you showed me to the other doctors and students, you said 'tum' and I turned. You 
said 'left' and I turned left. You told me to strip so everyone could see that my 
genitals are 'normal'. I stripped, and everyone saw. Could an 'imbecile' do that Mr. 
Treves? I understood. I understand." 
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"For the first time since we have become friends, I sense you are angry with me," said 
Treves, "perhaps it is justified, but listen to my side." Merrick interjects, "Oh, no, Mr. 
Treves, I ~ould never be angry with you, I have never been so happy, 10 I ... " 
" When I first saw you, I was filled with compassion. I thought your life must be one 
of misery. Doctors can't be expected to really know their patients, if we did, we'd 
loose all sUbjectivity. But I must also tell you (with shame), finding you also helped 
my career- exhibiting you to colleagues and students, describing as I did each growth 
on your body, each disfiguration, offering suggestions, possible diagnosis, well, I felt 
rather important, to say the least. I needed you to confirm me as bounded, belonging 
to the 'proper' social category; John, you confirm the pleasures and boundaries of my 
own identity. I could dismiss you as hopefully an imbecile because you served your 
purpose. You reassured me of my own integrity of the received images of my self. 
Yet, afterwards two people forced me to introspect, to examine part of myself, to 
compare my exhibition of you to his exhibition of you in the common freak shows, 
which I find so horrible and degrading. Then I had to ask myself why I found those 
shows so distasteful and saw nothing wrong in doing essentially the same only in a 
different, more refined and (to me) a socially 'meaningful' venue. I, like Socrates, was 
called to not only examine my life, but to examine the self in my life. Perhaps that's 
what he meant after all." 
"Mr. Treves," Merrick said softly after a pause for thought, "I never meant to cause 
you pain. Now you add to my burden. "John," Treves replied "Knowing you has 
brought me no burden, it has made me see you as other and my own face within that 
vision" II. I have failed you though for never in all of our time together have I asked 
you how you felt, if you felt your life is worth living ". "My friend," said Merrick, 
"the unexamined life ... whose life is it anyway? People who are not deformed rarely 
asked that question to those deformed." 
A knock on the door disrupts them. "Good evening Gentlemen. You two are looking 
particularly sombre, nothing amiss I hope," Mr. Carr Gomm said as he entered the 
room. The two men rise to greet him. "Oh, I see you're working on a mountain, may I 
join you? It looks a bit crooked." "Sir, you would be most welcome," said Treves. 
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"Now why such faces?" "Well, Sir, " said Treves, "we were just discussing Socrates, 
and a bit of reality." "Socrates", Carr Gomm replied, " now there was a mind inside a 
rather unpleasant body, so I've read". "What!" exclaimed Merrick, I assumed he was 
very handsome, his writings are very handsome." "Writings and the bodily 
appearance of those who write are not always or necessarily compatible," Carr Gomm 
replied. "If I recall correctly, it was Lavater and Montaigne's essays 12 that expressed 
the view that from a man's outward appearance the qualities of his soul could be 
deduced. Of course, that was really nothing new, 'had gone on since man had first 
started to ask questions. Of course, we don't generally believe in such things, 
although I do recall that even Goethe admired Montaigne's thoughts on physiognomy. 
Do hand me some glue, will you, Treves, you need some assistance with that side of 
the mountain, as it is it will never do. Now Montaigne, who was very into appearance 
and its relationship to soul, was particularly troubled by Socrate's appearance. In fact, 
Socrates put a cog in his wheel, so to speak. I believe Montaigne said something like 
this, 'It grieves me that Socrates, who was a perfect pattern of all great qualities 
should, as reports say, had so ugly a face and body, so out of keeping with the beauty 
of his soul, seeing how deeply he was enamoured of beauty, how infatuated he was by 
it! Nature did him an injustice!' ,,13 
"Like me", thought Merrick. Then he said, "But how did Socrates feel about himself, 
how did others react to him?" "He wrote," Carr Gomm continued, "that young men 
should look in a mirror to determine their appearance. If they were handsome, they 
should act virtuously so as to be worthy of their beauty; if ugly they should conceal 
their appearance by their moral accomplishments. 14" "So, it's the mind and deeds that 
should measure man, not the external body", said Merrick happily. "I have always 
thought so myself. 15 But knowing it in my head doesn't always help when I see the 
reaction to my body mirrored in the eyes of others." He sighs, "At least Narcissus was 
alone when he admired his perfection. I am defined by the whole' society in their 
reaction to me- nothing protects me from their mirror." 
"What do you wish for, John? asked Treves quietly. Merrick paused and answered, 
"Only to melt into a crowd or walk into a room unnoticed. I always worry when 
visitors come, so I try to keep my 'good' side facing them. Sometimes I know they do 
not understand what I say because I know my speech is afflicted. But they pretend to 
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understand. I wish they .would just say, 'please say the words again, we want to 
understand what you are saying.' And when their eyes meet, or they make some 
gestures between themselves they think I don't notice- but I do 16. Then I get a wave 
of sadness and it makes me feel more deformed. Sometimes I wish they would all 
disappear. " 
"Would it be better for you, John, to stop the visitors? asked Treves. " I had never 
considered that, "added Carr Gomm worriedly. 
"Oh no, please know, I do understand that in the eyes of others everyone looks for the 
reason for their own existence. This is the measure by which we each judge our own 
self-worth. But know this, my friends, universal approval or even acceptance of 
deformity is far less important than what I have found to be of the greatest value - the 
consistent love and friendship of a few." 17 
After an awkward silence (while the men busily add bits and pieces to the shaping 
mountain) Carr Gomm says, "It seems you have been examining your life, Joseph, 
and indeed in consideration of this topic alone, we who are approximately normal 
should also do the same, for we rarely think of what it would be like to have fate 
change that which we have so blithely taken for granted. And on that note, I must bid 
you both adieu, off to the Club. Goodnight, Gentlemen." Both men rise, bidding Mr. 
Carr Gomm, "Goodnight, sleep well. " 
"John", said Treves as he placed his hand on his shoulder, "I too must be off. So, until 
tomorrow when we resume our discussion I bid you sleep in peace. I will think on the 
many things we discussed tonight." "Goodnight, my friend," said Merrick looking at 
the still unfinished mountain. "On that slope I'll. add trees and brush and flowers, 
perhaps a goat or sheep and a cottage. Then we'll build up the other side." 
17 
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THREE DREAMS: A CONFUSED AND COMPLEX HEAP OF HUMANS 
"Will you be staying the night, Sir," asked the Club's butleL "Yes", said Carr Gomm 
sipping his brandy. "I'll be up shortly." "Very Good, Sir" said the butler as he walked 
out of the lounge. Later, in his room, Carr Gomm, now bathed and gowned in white 
stiff cotton, reached for the book he had been reading: The Poetry of William 
Wordsworth. Oddly, the book opened up to a poem titled "The Thorn" 18 He read for 
a while and felt somewhat disturbed. Placing the book back on his bed-table, he 
closed the lamp and, turning on his side, flounced the pillow, sighed, and quickly fell 
asleep. 
THE FIRST DREAM RAISES THORNY QUESTIONS 
"I a~ as old as time itself, stated Thorn, and I have seen and heard from the lichens 19 
things both wonderful and terrible. I externalise invisible impulses and create order. 
Martha Ray comes here to weep and each tear tells its own story. Pomegranate skin, 
Rue, and Queen Anne's Lace she drank, to no avail, to expel what she and Stephen 
begot. 20 It has always been so and always will. The weights of the act, the 
consequences, are borne heavily on the backs of women. From the most ancient times, 
we plants have been used to remove the unwanted. I think of Silphium, myoid frIend, 
long dead, rendered extinct because of her very potentency. Was that in the third or 
fourth century CE? Never mind, but used she was, from slaves to queens. 
Of course, some societies did have laws against contraception and abortion. Babylon 
and Syria, if I recall correctly. They had reasons of course, namely to increase their 
numbers, to gain more power. But the Greeks and Romans considered contraception 
and abortion as crimes only if the father objected, the concept of murder being 
considered only if the man was deprived of a male heir 21, that is. Of course, the 
advent of Christianity shifted some focal points, but God remained wholly miile: made 
like man, not woman. Therefore, societal decisions concerning contraception and 
abortion remained in the hands of men. The very earliest Roman Catholic Church 
accepted the norms of their particular societies, so abortion and contraception weren't 
sins in and of themselves, after all, during those times there wasn't much debate about 
'souls'. That all changed, of course all based on Aristotle, taken over by Aquinas. 22 I 
believe he somehow deduced that males were 'ensouled' after 40 days after 
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conception, 90 days for females: women of course weren't part of the original creative 
idea, just second thoughts brought in as an appendage to men. So it has remained. 
Infanticide? Equally long in historical practice, similarly linked; a way of controlling 
population, perhaps a causal link to puerperal madness, getting rid of the unwanted: 
when it was the norm, the general practice, there was no question of morality. I recall 
reading in one of Martha's tears a letter written by a Roman soldier to his pregnant 
wife: 'if it is a male keep it; if a female, expose it. ,23 Now, of course Constanti~e who 
converted 'to Christianity in 300 CE raised the question of infanticide as, shall we say, 
a social issue. He banned parental infanticide from his empire, but note: it was 
parental infanticide that was banned. This created a shift in responsibility from the 
famil~ to others, such as birth attendants, so generally his call for the recognition of 
life's sanctity didn't work out well in the long run. Napoleon, much, much later, tried 
to curb the practice as well. He even evoked the law, charging any convicted of 
drowning an infant in a sack 24 francs. Napoleon started foundling hospitals, 
complete with turnstiles where the unwanted could be placed, revolved, and 
institutionalised. Ifmy memory serves me correctly, it is estimated that in 1833 - 20 to 
30% of all new-borns of that year were discarded. 24 
Societies, throughout history have shown that whatever the shifting of a status quo 
position, be it contraception, abortion or infanticide, did not result in a causal chain 
reaction throwing everyone into the River Charon. Issues rise and fall, historically and 
culturally contingent, but one issue does not necessarily, logically or causally slide to 
moral disintegration. Within their own society, the ancient Greeks, for example, did 
not move from contraception to abortion to infanticide to the killing of toddlers, to 
killing children and so on. 
Those born defective? From ancient times to even today, they were immediately cast 
to the garbage heap, or returned, as practised in some African tribes, to the feeding-
ground of the animal they most closely resembled. 25 If they by chance survived, as 
dwarfs and giants, hermaphrodites or ogres, society made use of them, for good or 
evil. Of course, women were to blame for their appearance, for their very being. 
Whenever have you read that 'He' (or 'they') begot a monster? What have women 
been taught? Two reasons for their existence: sensual submission to man and the 
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bearing of children. These were the two reasons for her creation, and should woman 
fail in either she has no further excuse for encumbering the earth. Giving birth to 
monsters only confirmed what was suspected, the terrible duality of women. Men 
consider the great imaginative faculties of women to be the cause of monsters, as you 
well know, Carr Gomm. 
A muddled Carr Gomm interjects: 
Whatever are you talking about? Where is this going? How did you know I was here? 
Thorn: 
Well obviously, it is your dream after all- you're c.reating it, so you're here. 
Carr Gomm: 
And I don't like it one bit. Everything is flashing by and mixing up in my mind, my 
very principles are being jumbled! 
Thorn: 
But everything you know, everything you've experienced and read and seen are all 
here. Really, there's nothing new, just re-arrangements, that's all. 
Carr Gomm: 
It's that poem, " ... I've heard the moss is spotted red. With drops of that poor infant's 
blood; but kill a new-born infant thus, I do not think she could ... Oh misery, oh 
misery. " 26 
Thorn: 
What is it about the poem that disturbs you so? 
Carr Gomm (irritably): 
It's all the questions, of course. Did she give birth? Was the baby born a person, a 
human being? 27 Was the baby born dead? If it was born alive, did she murder it? 
What does it mean to be human being? If it was born alive, how did it look? Was it a 
monster? If it was a monster, was it still a person? 28 Was it. .. was it. .. 
Thorn: 
Like an Elephant? Was it deformed? If the baby was born alive and well formed, 
would it have been wrong to kill it? 
Carr Gomm: 
Thorn, you're going too fast! There are too many questions and too few answers. 
Thorn: 
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All right, then, just answer the last one. If Martha Ray's baby was born well formed 
and alive would it be morally wrong to kill it? 
Carr Gomm: 
Yes. 
Thorn: 
Even though Martha is mad, poor, and single? 
Carr Gomm: 
Yes. 
Thorn: 
What kind of life would the child have being raised by a mad woman, cast out from 
society, single and alone? 
Carr Gomm: 
Well, 1. .. 
Thorn: 
Perhaps Imagme them living in Whitechapel Market, you pass by there often, 
"infinitely various lines and contrivances of shops and stalls and gaudy inns and 
public houses; the overhanging clothes, the mounds of vegetables, the confused heaps 
of fish, all cast about to catch the pence of the bountiless dishevelled 
wom~n ... shoeless children ... leering thin-handed thief, the bully of his court, the silly-
Billy of the neighbourhood- on whom the neighbourhood is merciless- endless 
swarms of ragged children, fill road and pavement." 29 Is that what bothers you? Their 
. quality of life? Whose quality? Whose life? Moreover, since Martha is mad the 
authorities would probably take her to an asylum and send the child to a workhouse, 
you know that. Is that what bothers you? 
Carr Gomm: 
Stop! You don't understand. We created those institutions for the benefit of society, 
without them what would happen to all those people? 
Thorn: 
It seems to me that in the creation if institutions you've done something worse. I 
know you personally have worries about them. You know what they are really like; 
they rob people of all self-esteem, reduce them to mere things, beasts, numbers, and 
'property', entitled to little or no respect. Is that what you want as an alternative for 
Martha Ray and her child, if in fact she had one? And if she did have one, in a fit of 
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mental normalcy realised what lay ahead for her would you judge her for sparing her 
child such a fate? 
Carr Gomm: 
Stop! Life is sacred! 
Thorn: 
Gracious, I just experienced such a flashback! I remember a similar dialogue more 
than two thousand years ago written by Plato in his Phaedo. Socrates was asked by 
Cebes to explain his views about suicide. In their discussion, Socrates said that 
humans are instruments of the gods, thus to kill another human or to kill oneself 
would risk the wrath of the gods. This view was adapted, modified by mighty Thomas 
Aquinas who sought to synthesise church and state. He was quite clear that God 
subjected all things to the power of man. 30 
Carr Gomm: 
Yes, and I believe this is true. 
Thorn: 
Dear Carr Gomm, someone wrote that discussions such as 'immortality', 
'Domination' and divine right of Homo sapiens should be confined to the philosophy 
of religion, and should be separated from discussions concerning ethics. 31 Yet, I have 
often wondered if this is possible. It seems to me that we can't draw a line so easily. 
After all, organised religions, like medicine and business are largely creations of 
society and influence and are influenced by the prevailing ethics of the time- no 
matter when or where one lives. 
Carr Gomm: 
I do believe the way in which I have been taught. Humans have intrinsic worth. 
Thorn: 
Have you ever considered why you feel this way? What if the baby of Martha Ray 
was born severely defective, grotesquely deformed, would your position change? 
What would you consider the quality of their life to be? Now, you must not concern 
yourself with this because you claim it's not the quality of a person's life that is the 
problem, it is the sanctity of life. Let's unpack this. You believe that the deliberate 
destruction of human life is fundamentally wrong. 
Carr Gomm: 
I do. 
Thorn: 
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So it does not matter to you what may happen to a person in her life as long as the life 
is lived, born 'defective' or normal. 
Carr Gomm: 
Well, I think so, yes. 
Thorn: 
Is all life sacred? 
Carr Gomm: 
Yes. 
Thorn: 
What about animals, then? 
Carr Gomm: 
Animals? Animals? I hadn't considered them, of course they too live, but.. 
Thorn: 
'Not part of the discussion of these times I suspect, so we'll set it aside. 32 What you 
are saying is that if someone is a member of the human species only then is life 
sacred. Just being human and being alive is enough. Doesn't that make you a moral-
bully? 
Carr Gomm: 
What! I am certainly not a moral bully. Really, Thorn I've had quite enough of this 
dream. 
Thorn: 
Calm down and listen. You say that human life per se has sanctity. This differs greatly 
from the view that the quality of life may depend on circumstances. So holding to 
your view, you don't care if Martha Ray (lets say she's visibly normal) and her child 
(visibly abnormal) suffer and deteriorate in slums or workhouses. Forget about the 
level and degree of their dependency, wishes, burdens ... being alive and human is 
enough. No other value must override the sanctity of life. Is that what you mean? You 
can't compare the value of a life- from one most hopeful to one most vegetative. 
Human life is the ultimate sanctified means that you must preserve it beyond any 
other considerations, you must prolong it, and in fact you must make as many more 
human lives as possible. Of course, to accommodate this we'd have to build more 
institutions, we'd have a real problem with the population growth and ... 
Carr Gomm: 
No! That's not what I mean. 
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Thorn: 
Then what do you mean? 
Carr Gomm: 
I mean that human life is worth savmg. This is not to say that I don't regard 
intelligence, friendship, or autonomy as important considerations. Its life qua life 
above all that I consider to be the moral foundation. 
Thorn: 
What would happen, Carr Gomm, if tomorrow you fell seriously ill, went into a coma, 
lost your capacity to think, feel, experience life? Would your sanctity of life position 
change if faced with yourself and not an abstract' person? Because, remember any 
human life, in all forms have priority over all other life forms. Holding to this view, 'a 
vegetative state with vital signs is a sanctified vegetative state.' 33 You never face any 
dilemma of whether or not to save a human life, it is always saved always prolonged 
no matter what. But, Carr Gomm, can you answer a theoretical question whether 
having a heartbeat; 'being alive' can support any moral value alone? Is the life you 
value really valuable without consideration of its condition, quality, or circumstance? 
Carr Gomm: 
I would personally not like to be kept alive as a vegetable. I wouldn't be 'me' any 
longer. I guess what I mean by the sanctity of life is just that I do value deeply human 
life, but when the prognosis is made that' life' suggests that it will be one of misery or 
pain then I diverge. 
Thorn: 
So, I think you are saying that life is of value and on that position we agree. The 
problem with people who hold to the sanctity of life position is that everything other 
than absolute life, such as pleasure, happiness, imagination, must be sacrificed to it. 
Life must not only be prolonged, no matter how desolate, but lives must also be 
multiplied. Another consequence of this position is that choices concerning life are 
immobilised: all human lives are valued equally, even when some are unborn, mad, 
vegetative and others living, sane and spirited. It fears complexity and is an easy way 
to run from life's burdens, simply by clinging to absolute avoidance of choice. 
Carr Gomm: 
Thorn, if! understand you, if the baby was born deformed, a 'monster' the sanctity of 
life position would require that its life be lived, prolonged no matter what the 
consequences. Yet, the quality of life position, on the other hand, seems to rely on 
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rather vague concepts. I think its view is that the value of a life varies with the 
circumstances. The value then would be contingent on circumstances, absolute, 
infinite or maximum but only in relationship to the circumstances. Some 
circumstances would reduce the value others would enhance it. I think it means also 
that in holding that a life is not worth living does not imply killing just for killing or 
the taking of a life of value. 
I wonder, would it make a moral difference if Martha Ray killed her infant .because it 
was born deformed, destined for what she perceived to be a valueless life most likely 
of misery? But maybe it is a question of to whom a life is worth ·living. Martha Ray to 
the infant.. .Joseph to his mother ... His mother to society ... Joseph to me ... has his life 
been worth living? Who decides? Is it society, the individual? 
It seems that we can't escape the fact that a judgement that one person's life is less 
valuable than another's is a standard we set based on our own interpretation of life's 
quality. Moreover, what we consider the 'quality of a life' is certainly formed, to a 
large part, on our culture and its particularities. However, shouldn't we consider that 
the standard should be subject to the standards of what Joseph feels, or that of a 
normative 'reasonable person'? But, which person, who chooses? Oh misery. Oh 
misery. Even if we knew ahead of time that a baby would be born defective, should 
we kill it to spare it a life of pain or degradation? It would of course depend on how 
bad the disability was, and the scientific knowledge of the times and the society, and 
their resources and their culture and ... and ... Anyway, right now we doctors don't 
take part in infanticide, nor do we play any major part in investigating suspected 
deaths we don't have to face such difficult decisions, such life and death choices. It's 
really in all together a different area, left up to the magistrates and midwives, not our 
business, really. 34 
Thorn: 
Carr Gomm, just because right now you don't take part does not remove you from the 
human arena. Besides, logically, when you have patients admitted because of failed 
abortions or certifications of death you are a definitely a part of the 'business'. Your 
vocation is society'S creation, and as you are part of society, you are responsible to it. 
Martha Ray chose alone, as women before her and after her are oft compelled to 
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choose. However, you are a part of the network and like it or not, you can't avoid 
responsibility. 35 
Carr Gomm: 
Thorn, up until this dream my life was tidy, ordered, reasonable, and rational. You 
enter and it becomes confused. You force me to consider the role of women, plants, 
history and most of all, Joseph. Knowing Joseph has taught me to look at deformity 
differently. While I know intellectually that that nature is capricious in her creation, I 
must admit when I see him I suffer a confusion of feelings. He reminds me of 
unresolved feelings about myself. Perhaps we who are normal have become 
complacent about understanding and accepting that nature makes differences. We 
position ourselves like Procrustes, trying to make everyone fit into a tidy, comfortably 
similar, familiar mould. Oh Thorn, where do we draw the line? What will become of 
us? 
Thorn: 
You will survive. It is the movement, you see, into the introduction to the awareness 
of difference that matters and subsequently into the ethical issues that rise as part of 
the discussion. Celebrate the beginning of the debate, enjoy the conversations arising, 
and keep them open and alive! Sometimes it is in the mist of confusion or madness 
that choices are made. 36 As lichens know, there are no guarantees as to the absolute 
rightness of choice, but then, the.re never were. 37 
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THE SECOND DREAM PUTS TREVES ON THE DOCK 38 
Treves unlocked the door of his home on Wimpole Street. " 'Tis a shame", he 
thought, "that Anne and the children are off to the cottage, I could do with both idle 
chatter and hugs". He ate a cold plate left by his housekeeper, bathed, donned his 
nightwear and climbed between the starched sheets. No sooner than his eyes closed, 
he was fast asleep. 
TREVES: 
The most striking feature about him is his enormous head. Its circumference is about 
36 inches, that of a normal man's waist. From his· brow, look there, is a projecting 
bony mass like a loaf of bread, while on the back, turn around if you will, hangs a bag 
of fungous-looking prickled skin, the surface, you will note, looks like rotted 
cauliflower and larger than a Tangerine orange. He makes noises, but cannot 
articulate properly. No doubt, he is an imbecile. From his lower jaw, face front please, 
there are long dark hairs. From the upper jaw extends a mass of pinkish bone. He had 
a similar piece of flesh removed years ago in Leicester, to no avail. The nose, you will 
note, is only recognisable as such by the position. Otherwise, it appears merely as a 
lump of flesh. Such deformities render his face incapable of all expression. It is 
impossible to tell whether he is laughing or crying. The back, you will note is quite 
deformed with the same type of pendulous masses of cauliflower-like skin. The right 
hand, resembling a reptilian fin, has a massive overgrowth and is useless .By contrast, 
the other arm and hand, are quite remarkable, so very human, shaped beautifully and 
covered with normal skin and delicate hairs. From his chest hangs another bag of 
flesh, like a lizard's neck. His lower limbs, note please, share common characteristics 
with his deformed arm. Unfortunately, to add to his troubles, he has a shortening of 
one leg. This we believe was caused by tuberculosis when an infant. Disrobe, please. 
His genitals, Sirs, are remarkably normal. Robe, please. Gentlemen, Comments? 
MERRICK: 
, The most striking thing about him is his terribly normal sized head. This allows him 
to lie down and sleep in a normal position, and therefore, to dream any dream that 
may enter without the weight of others' dreams that accumulate, ripen, and having no 
escape, cause greater deformity. From his brow, we see two alert brown eyes 
straightforward, looking keenly into a promised successful future; a benevolent 
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enlightenment rather in a conformed-self enlightened state. He decides for others and 
. when stakes are high, he becomes 'father'. He creates. A good example is in his 
creation of 'John' Merrick instead of calling me by my given name 'Joseph'. Did he 
ever acquiesce to me, Joseph, my own wishes or desires? Did he ever grant me 
autonomy? No·! He reinforced the 'Priestly Model', the 'divine right of kings', free 
consent counts for nothing; he holds the power. He negates the following: the right to 
full eJisclosure of needed information, the right to being regarded as a self-determining 
agent. He negated the duty of fidelity, removed my uniqueness, and disavowed 
compassion. Look, the mouth, moustached, it is deformed by self-satisfaction, 
rendered incapable of self-critical speech, and thus the ability to change. His back, 
turn please, is utterly straight from being kept against a wall ready to reply to any 
criticisms of his social order and perceived reality- defensive, locked. His hands, as a 
surgeon, are well developed and ready to carve up anyone to make them fit into the 
world of the normal. Due, in part to his brain structure, the right arm is stronger than 
his left; but both are incapable of the charitable act of giving. 'The left arm, as we 
have noted, is smaller than the right. Its principle purpose is to cover the genitals, 
which are viewed as a specific area in need of constant restriction, governance, and 
chastisement. For their own good.' However, the greatest of problems, Gentlemen, is 
his laggard loss of humanity. This process we ascribe to either one or two diseases, 
but they overlap under the broad classiiication of 'Modernity'. The first disease is 
called Volatileidealbodism. This, as you know, involves removing of self, or being 
removed from others into a world of biotechnology where one concentrates only on 
one aspect of life or on one biological organ, obsession with the 'normal' and thus 
loses the complexity of the whole, be it body or mind. The second possibility is 
Bodylogicalone: removal to the abstraction and logic of philosophy, providing safety 
from a real and unimagined world (and its variant Bodylitalone: Isolated immersion 
into literature, loosing the ability to enter a mutual dialogue). In summary, he cannot 
comprehend difference, he has lost empathy, and he has lost humanitY. Comments? 
TREVES: 
No. No. You don't understand. It was like that, but it wasn't. What do you expect of 
doctors anyway? I do realise now that exhibiting John in the amphitheatre I 
surrendered his self to his existential condition. He was an object to me, not a person 
and wrongly used as a means to my end. But that's the way we do things in medicine 
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today. We present actual cases scientifically, objectively. 39 From these paradigms, we 
learn certain critical lessons and when faced with other presentations, we draw from 
the composite of our knowledge, our common truths. Knowing John as I do now I see 
the wrongess of it, the removal of his autonomy and I can but try to change the 
manner or at least be sensitive to the manner in which we present our 'cases.' 
However, the real problem for me is this: when facing a disease where do we doctors 
draw the line between being scientifically objective on the one hand and being an 
advisor, teacher and importantly a friend on the other? 40 
If I move from the position of scientist or information source to become a part of my 
patient's life in at least my concept of friendship, then the patient may well gain 
greater power over the relationship. I mean this in the sense that although she does not 
have the scientific knowledge of the disease that I have, the emotional bonds of 
friendship may in fact prevent me from doing what I as an interested, but scientifically 
distanced physician should medically do for her. Let me give you an example: 41 
I am, as you know a surgeon. One night I was called to see Edward, Prince of Wales 
who was ill with a painful abdomen. I diagnosed acute appendicitis and advised an 
immediate operation. Now, the Prince of Wales, as you know, was known to be a bit 
stubborn. He was determined to proceed with his coronation on the following day 
rather than disappoint the nation. I said to him, " In that case, Sir, you will go to the 
Abbey as a corpse." Ultimately persuaded, he underwent a successful appendectomy. 
I did not have a personal relationship with him. He was King and I subject, no 
emotional bonds clouded my diagnosis nor weighed against my insistence upon 
immediate treatment. 
(Freves pauses.) 
I had a daughter; she was more than friend to me. One day she complained of a bad 
stomach-ache. I teased her saying that she must have eaten too many red cherries. 
Days past and she still complained. 'It will pass', I said, 'you're just growing up'. It 
was not that I was too busy, that I didn't hear, or didn't care. She was too close to my 
heart to ascribe any real serious interest. It couldn't happen. The foHowing day I 
found her in bed quite feverish, her abdomen hard to the touch. I operated on that very 
day for appendicitis, but it was too late. Peritonitis had already set in and she died. My 
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daughter died because I was too close In my love for her to recognise what I 
scientifically should have. 
So, where do you want the power line drawn? How does a doctor, first a human, 
protect himself against the power of emotion, of being too drawn into a patients 
narrative, of loving too much to be of any practical use? You suggest that doctors 
abuse the relationship Of power based on our medical knowledge and that in acting as 
counsellors or friends we could abuse it more. I suggest the argument is not sound 
unless one attempts to identify the doctor-patient relationship perhaps in defining the 
somewhat subjective and illusive parameters of human 'friendship'. 
Yes, i call you' John'. 42 But you never objected. I did not do it out of malevolence. 
When I heard you first say your name I really thought you were saying' John'. Then, 
when I became involved in your life I suppose I did, in a sense want to re-create you, 
to take away some of the pain I knew you had endured. It was not meant to take away 
your personhood. Dying, I wrote my memoirs and I wrote your given name, 'Joseph', 
then I crossed it out, and above wrote' John' ... ' John'. I believe the meaning of the 
name is ' beloved of God. ' 
MERRICK: 
My story is finished then? 
TREVES: 
No, it has begun. 
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• 
THE THIRD DREAM PLACES MERRICK ON THE TOP OF THE MOUNTAIN 
Merrick stood and walked painfully to where his night-clothes were stored. Clumsily, 
but efficiently changing into them he looked for a moment at his bed. Then his eyes 
travelled to the pictures decorating his walls, pictures of the 'beautiful normal': a 
child sleeping supine, head on pillow, The Good Shepherd and His flock, his beloved 
mother, Mrs. Kendal, the Princess of Wales ... "J wonder", he thought," as kind as Mr. 
Carr Gomm and Mr. Treves are, if they have any idea of what it is like to be 
deformed. But the beginning to understanding begins with an inquiry, and for that I 
am grateful." 
He said his nightly prayers and placing a number of pillows on the bed near the wall 
and to each side, Merrick climbed in the feathered nest. The bony masses and the 
pendulous flaps of his skin had grown steadily worse; the outgrowth of his upper jaw, 
the trunk, had increased greatly, and his head had grown so heavy by this time that he 
had difficulty in holding it up. Rather like in a seated or crouched position, he clasps 
his hands over his legs and rested his ponderous and heavy head on his knees. For to 
sleep otherwise, would asphyxiate him. He fell asleep and dreamed .... 
"Is it not beautiful here on the top of the mountain," said Joseph throwing happily his 
arms up skywards. "I see! I feel! I perceive the expt:rit:nce of all of life: colours, pain, 
joy, and noise from outside and within -all here in my real world. Yet, always I dreanl 
of things, of body corps propre, accessing all that exists. Recognise my structure, 
expressed in all of nature's physical laws, the vital order, characterised by my aptitude 
to the world and know I perceive, I have lived experience- which is dynamic and a 
source of my meaning. 43 
Look there, an elephant fights with a dragon; pygmies ride on wings of butterflies 44 
and see, my mother, Thorn, climbing that slope with Mr. Carr Gomm. And you, my 
friend, my companion Mr. Treves, look there at the life I have travelled; all within the 
content of me, but not implicated in it: ahead of what is real, imagined. What is my 
meaning? I am a deformed body, yet a still-lived being. 45 I weigh the quality of my 
life, the good against the bad. I access all that exists. I cannot change my situation, yet 
I also do not constantly despair. In thinking of the quality of life, different people will 
have different ideas concerning in what 'quality' consists- mine is neither theirs, nor 
31 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
theirs mine. I stretch, I lie down, 46 I sleep balanced here, tip-top of the mountain. 
, Pain. MeacupaMeacupaMeamaximacupa 47 Pain. The dragon fears nothing except the 
elephant with whom he will engage in battle, entwining himself around the elephant 
and inflicting fatal blows. However, as the elephant finally collapses, his fall crushes 
the dragon to death. I have been loved. I am set free. 'Nothing ever dies.' " 48 
THE DESIRE TO BE LIKE OTHERS 
Treves is recorded in his Reminisces as saying that Merrick "often said he so wished 
he could lie down to sleep 'like other people'. I think on the last night he must, with 
some determination, have made that experiment" (Montagu: 1979: 64-67). Thus, it 
came about that his death was due to the longing that had dominated his life- the 
desire to '.be like other people' . 
. In the death of Merrick, Treves resists stressing in death· what he failed to come to 
terms with in Merrick's life: his agency and his common bond with all humanity. 
Wanting to be like other people is a universal, if intermittent desire- as is the opposite 
impulse, to be regarded as unique. None of us exceeds in either, and Treves' failure in 
recognising this in himself and Merrick is like us all. 
If Merrick's body experienced one sort of transformation, his personal status 
underwent another. The events of his life were such that they fit into a social narrative 
we find easily recognisable- that of a worthy but down-trodden being overcoming 
disfigurement, poverty, race, gender or other handicap finding reassurance of moral 
worth through the intercession of others-through real people not imagined fairy 
godmothers, or magical intervention. Merrick's story, as authors Graham and 
Oehlschlaeger (1992) say, 'is one that defies closure ... is reinterpreted and interpreted 
and with each new telling is added a particular dimension ... asking if appearances is, 
after all, a misleading mask.' His story is also one that heeds the call of the other 
showing that the virtues of courage and integrity outlast even death itself. 
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PROTEUS 
Ovid wrote (Metamorphoses vii 7 quoted in Bauman: 1993: 22) .of Proteus that, 
"People have seen him at one time in the shape of a young man, at another 
transformed into a lion; sometimes he used t6 appear to them as a raging wild boar, 
or again as a snake, which they shrink from touching; or else horns transformed him 
into a bull. Often he could be seen as a stone, or a tree ... " 
In 1986, Joseph Merrick's medical disorder was diagnosed and named, 'The Proteus 
Syndrome' (Tibbles and Cohen: 1986:683-685). A type of neurofibromatosis, the 
Proteus syndrome is a rare disfiguring disease. It occurs as a mutation of the gen'es of 
a host, and one who is effected may not have received the mutations from their 
parents. It involves atypical growth of the bones, skin, head, and a variety of other 
symptoms. 
As of 1986, there were approximately 50 documented cases world-wide. Reported 
cases have been isolated occurrences, suggesting that the disease is not hereditary. It 
affects both sexes equally and has no particular racial, geographic or ethnic 
distribution.' It is an extremely variable condition and the severity of the syndrome 
ranges from mild to severe. There is, as yet, no way to detect the disease in utero. 
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SUMMARY OF SECTION ONE 
In this section, I opened a conversation concerning those 'visibly different'. The 
example, using and creating narratives arising from the life of Joseph Merrick, The 
Elephant Man, identified some of the problems confronted when we 'normal' 
confront those 'not like us', and vice versa. 
In writing the face of difference I sought to identify both some of the emotions 
disabled people feel and ethical issues that arise when faced with a Procrustean 
society. To a great extent, this debate is timeless. I further suggest that arguments 
concerning the 'sanctity of life', and 'quality of life' are social variables that have 
always been dependent upon an infinite range of economic, social, technological and 
political factors. Through narrative form, I suggest that disease, deformity, and even 
perceptions of personal identity are, in part, mutable expressions of cultural and 
personal values. 
"Philosophers", writes Singer (1996: 121)" are human beings, and they are subject to 
all the preconceptions of the society to which they belong. Sometimes they succeed in 
breaking free of the prevailing ideology: most often they become its most 
sophisticated defenders." 
In vIewmg people who are deformed or disabled, what philosophy has usually 
emphasised is their difference. As Silvers (1998:3) points out, in searching for limited 
cases, philosophers have turned to their prototypical portrayals of disability for 
illumination. For example, whether the congenitally colour-blind understand colour 
terms has been used to delineate the role direct observation plays in understanding 
(ibid). This largely sets those deformed or disabled on the fringe, and as was Merrick, 
marginalised. 
In this section, I have illuminated a broader human face to the discussion of 
difference, emphasising inclusion. I have shown that patients and those who interact 
with them, their ethics, society, culture, politics, economics, religion, and so on, are 
woven into rich and sometimes inseparable webs of complexity. Adding my voice to 
the story of Joseph Merrick, I have further argued in the postmodern perspective, the 
importance of being for the Other. 
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Literature, as Nussbaum (1990: 3) writes, shows 
"that life contains significant surprises, that our task as agents, 
is to live as good characters in a good story do, 
caring about what happens, resourcefully confronting each new thing. " 
The particular style or form in which I presented the face of difference was 
deliberately chosen. I suggest that in the teaching of applied ethics, literature and 
literary forms may serve as an important source to broaden human understanding. 
They succeed, I argue, because they remind us that in daily practise, we all play and 
balance roles. We constantly must, for example, disentangle (and not always 
successfully) emotion from logic, set arguments into various systems of justice, while 
respecting our second sub-text, a suffering patient, who has his or her own story to 
tell. 
In the example of Joseph Merrick, I identified that it can happen that those with 
disabilities or deformities, betrayed by history, could survive a system in which they 
were reduced to mere things; property entitled to neither rights nor respect. As shown 
in the story of Joseph Merrick, his survival was ensured because of the compassion 
and interaction of fellow human beings, being there for the Other. He survived and 
retained his humanity as well as his faith that evil and suffering were not the sum total 
of his identity- or necessarily the destiny of those who would follow. We must ask no 
less than he did: to fashion an ethic that matches the unique dangers the deformed and 
disabled face, one that will enable us to recognise in these dangers, opportunities for 
humane services and committed living. 
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NOTES TO SECTION ONE 
1. In the accounts of Howell and Ford (1980:95-99), Sparks (1980:254) and 
Montagu (1971 :55), a London 'bobby' comes to the assistance of Merrick. 
Retold, the introduction of a woman refers to Gilligan's theory, In a Different 
Voice (1982:51-56): "Given the differences in women's conceptions of self and 
morality, women bring to the life cycle a different point of view and order human 
experience in terms of different priorities." (Ibid: 56). 
2. Merrick, because of a growth on his palate (Graham and Oehlschlaeger: 1992:48) 
suffered speech impairment. Normal persons disabled by speech impairments 
realise that their speech is impaired. Non-speech impaired persons often pretend, 
usually out of misguided good intentions, to 'understand' what a speech-impaired 
person is saying. This evokes a complex set of messages sent to the speech-
impaired person: the appreciation of attention, but a negation of the value of what 
they are saying. Consequently, the received perception of their self as a disvalue 
is reinforced. As Strauss (1996:77) writes:" The pretense that all is normal may 
undermine social interaction and make encounters quite uncertain." 
3. "He told an elaborate story of a 'fright his mother had received shortly before 
his birth from having been knocked down by an elephant in a circus. " Treves' 
Report to the London Pathological Society in March 1885 (cited in Howell and 
Ford: 1980:380 
As Todd (1995) identifies, the complex link between birthing and the 'imaginative 
faculties of women' was particularly evident during the 1 t h and 18th centuries in 
Britain. Imagination took main stage. It was claimed that imaginative faculties in 
~ 
general caused an interruption into the ream of abnormalcy. Imagination gave self-
identity to the realm of spirit and mind and shifted it as an agent of threatened 
identity. An effect of imagination, presented as a 'scientific' fact, is the following 
(written in 1726 by a Dr. Maubray in his book Female Physician [ibid: 65]: 
" But however, to come closer to the IMAGINATION of Pregnant Women, who 
knows not that affects the INFANT in the Womb? Whence is it then that we have so 
many deform'd Persons, crooked Bodies, ugly Aspects, distorted Mouths, wry Noses 
and the like, in all Countries; but from the IMAGINATION of the Mother; while she 
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either conceives such Phantasms in her Mind, or while she frequently and intently 
fixes her Eyes upon such deform 'd Persons or disagreeable OBJECTS? .Wherefore it 
is very wrong, and highly imprudent in Women that have conceived, to please 
themselves so much in playing with Dogs, Squirrels, Apes &c. carrying them on their 
Laps or Bosoms and feeding, kissing or hugging them, as I have both often heard and 
seen with my own Eyes. And besides, the same is the case when the Natural Faculties 
are all at work informing, or ripening the FOETUS: for if the Woman be surpriz'd at 
any sudden Evil, or frightened at any unseemly Sight; the Humours and Spirits 
presently retire downwards and (as it were) abscond themselves in the Recess of the 
WOMB: From whence immediately a strong IMAGINATION of the disagreeable 
Thing" (whether seen or heard only) seizes her Mind; and the Forming Faculty (going 
on in the Interim) quickly impresses the Imaginary Idea of That thing heard of, or the 
Shape and Form of That thing seen, upon the FOETUS. The same is the Reason, that 
if a Mouse, Rat, Weazel, Cat or the like, leaps suddenly upon a Woman that has 
conceived, or if an Apple, Pear, Cherry &c. fall upon any part of her Body; the 
MARK of the same thing (be it what it will) is instantly imprinted, and will manifestly 
appear on the same Part or Member of the CHILD." 
The concept of the power of imagination, specifically that of a pregnant woman's 
imaginative faculties, with its ability to misshape, blemish, or make a monstrous child 
began the teratological debate, which in a variety of forms, is present today. Joseph 
Merrick, in his Autobiography writes: 
"My feet and legs are covered with a lumpy skin, also my body, like that of an 
elephant, and almost the same colour, in fact no one would believe until they saw it, 
that such a thing could exist". (Autobiography of Joseph Carey Merrick cited in 
Montagu: 1971:109-110, Howell and Ford: 1980:168-169). 
Tom Norman, one of Merrick's early exhibitors is quoted as saying (Howell and Ford: 
1980:83)"But you could indeed exhibit anything in those days [he· wrote]. Yes, 
anything from needle to an anchor, a flea to an elephant, a bloater, you could exhibit 
as a whale. It was not the show, but the tale you told." As was the custom of the time, 
exhibitors often distributed printed brochures containing 'facts' about their exhibits. 
Howell and Ford (1980:89-90) believe Merrick to be the author of this 
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'autobiography'. Graham and Oehlschlaeger (1992: 27 however, point to 
'detachment' as the persistent effect of the composition, suggesting that it was either 
written by an agent or by Merrick himself, separating his physical body from the spirit 
within. Even in literature, the mindlbody interactionism, first articulated by Descartes, 
and discussed by contemporary thinkers, may be seen. 
4. These non-lexical exchanges are particularly well evidenced in Lynch's film 
(1979); Merrick becomes a cause celebre. Visitors come to his room for various 
reasons. Some come to increase their social standing, some out of friendship, 
some for financial gain, some for evil. All come, on one level or another to satisfy 
their curiosity. The curiosity theory, according to Carrol (1990: 159) rests 
basically on 'three psychological claims: 1) humans are naturally curious about 
conceptual aberrations of the sort embodied by 'monsters'; 2) humans tend to 
experience pleasure in having this curiosity stimulated and rewarded; and 3) the 
cognitive pleasure associated with the discovery of the horrific is able to 
sufficiently outweigh, overcome and compensate for the unpleasant emotions of 
fear and disgust normally evoked.' Another interesting thought concerning the 
attraction-repulsion paradox is raised by Solomon (1956:34) claiming the 
underlying desire to view those visibly different rests on a sexual basis: the 
'normal' wondering how those 'abnormal' have sexual intercourse. 
5. As Carey (1989) identifies, society appears to focus only on the 'outer' man and 
thus denies those handicapped any of the dreams, desires and ambitions taken for 
granted in the visibly normal. Indeed, is there any reason why those visibly 
different, handicapped or disabled should be denied basic human impulses? Why 
do we tend to raise our voices when communicating to deaf people who we know 
'read lips'? 
6. The fields of medicine and law, by and large in all contemporary societies, have 
been granted autonomy. It is important to emphasise that these are social 
constructs. While both of these professions are powerful lobbies, one may ask if 
the autonomy granted to them is wholly justified. Society expects " more than 
morally required" (De George: 1990: 457) of these professionals as opposed to 
common citizens. With the advent of mass media, the public is, or has the 
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opportunity to be better informed on subjects such as medicine and law. While it 
is true that not all citizens have the depth of knowledge that, for example, doctors 
or lawyers may have, it remains professional arrogance to presuppose that they 
cannot comprehend what information does exist. 
7. " ... and if I say again that the greatest good of man is daily to converse about 
virtue, and that concerning which you hear me examining myself and others, and 
that life which is unexamined is not worth living- that you are still likely to 
believe ... " Plato, The Apology o/Socrates, SCR: 39-41. 
8. The screenplay by Lynch (1979: 112) clearly identifies the dilemma of Treves: 
"ANNE: Frederick, why are you so Interested in this particular case? TREVES: I 
don't know. I can't explain it. If this is an intelligent man, trapped in the body of 
a monster, then I'm under a moral obligation to help him free that mind, free that 
spirit as best I can, to help him live as full and content a life as possible. But! If 
he's an imbecile, whose body I can't treat and whose mind I can't touch, well, 
then my obligation is discharged. They can put him where they will; he won't be 
bothered, I won't be bothered, and everyone's conscience can remain free and 
untroubled. And that's my dilemma ... what is in his mind?" 
Treves makes the claim that his moral obligation to Merrick is based on his 
possession or not of intelligence. Singer (1996: 120) would argue against setting the 
arbitrary boundary of intelligence as the limit for the concern of other beings. He 
(ibid) writes: 
"If a being is not suffering, is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment 
or happiness there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of 
sentience (using the term as convenient, if not strictly accurate shorthand for the 
capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only defensible 
boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this boundary by some 
characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary w.ay." 
9. Redding (1996: 1 00) makes this point: "As long as doctors have been able to draw 
on the conception of science as the authority about the world, they have been able 
to legitimise the claim to 'always know best' for their patients. The equation of 
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the subjective view based on experience with simple error, to be corrected by 
scientific truth, has served to keep patients· disenfranchised in the governance of 
their own corporeal selves." It may be suggested that if a patient is given a voice 
as its own distinctive authority (challenging the distribution of power based on 
science-as-the-final word) then the control of the doctor is challenged- which I 
suggest it should be. 
10. From-Treves' Remembrances (cited in Montagu: 1970:39) " Merrick, I may say, 
was now one of the most contented creatures I have ever chanced to meet. More 
than once he said to me, 'I am happy every hour of the day' ." 
11. In this perspective, "Being for is a leap from isolation to unity; yet not towards a 
fusion, that mystical dream of shedding the burden of identity, but to an alloy of 
those precious qualities dependent fully on the preservation of its ingredients' 
eternity and identity" writes Bauman (1995: 51). This is reflected in other 
postmodernist writers such as Levin (1988: 470) saying, ' It is only by virtue of 
our vision, our capacity to see, that Being is made visible: visible as the lighting 
in the care of which we and all other beings on this planet are destined to live or 
die.' 
12. Michel Eyquem de Montaigne (1533-1592) was a Pyrrhonian skeptic. Pyrrhonian 
skepticism suggests the suspension of conviction in matters that are removed 
from appearances. Montaigne, in defence of the Catholic Church, while not 
adopting this thesis, adapted a skeptic argument to say that the human faculties of 
sense and reason cannot be used to identify the true nature of things. Because of 
the fallibility of human reason and sense, we should not use them to judge matters 
of divine nature. Instead, all pretences of natural und~rstanding should yield to 
the authority of the Church, which is supernaturally inspired (Blackburn: 1996: 
248-249) In his publication Essais (1580) translated later in English as Essays 
(1603), while attracted to the metaphysics of Socrates, Montaigne remains 
troubled by his physical appearance. Drawing somewhat vaguely from the 
philosophical argument of Montaigne, Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741-1801) a 
Swiss Reformed Church pastor claimed that from outward appearances, 
particularly emphasising head shape and facial features, one could deduce the 
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quality of a' person's soul. According to one researcher, B. M. Stafford 
(1987: 185-192), the theological basis of Lavater's claim rests on man being 
created in the image of God, however, through the sins of man, blemished 
offspring may result. 
13. M. Montaigne. 1958. Essays. London: Penguin Books: 336. 
14. According to Diogenes Laertius who wrote Lives of the Philosophers in early 
third century CE (Clark: 1997: 4) Socrates cleverly used his appearance as a point 
on which to open some of his philosophical debates. 
15. The following is a quatrain from Isaac Watts' poem 'False Greatness' in Horae 
Lyricae (cited in Graham and Oehlschlaeger 1992: 14) Merrick (quoted in 
Montagu: 1971: 110 )was often fond of saying: 
"Was I so tall, could reach the pole, 
Or grasp the ocean with a span; 
I would be measured by the soul, 
The mind's the measure of the man." 
16. As Macgregor (1979: 115-118) rightfully points out, there are dimensions of' 
communication, "nonlexical" (kenesic, paralinguistical and proximal) usually 
received by individuals at a subliminal level that may directly serve to both 
positively and negatively impact on an individual's self-esteem. Komesaroff 
(1995: 69-77) as well as others identify the importance of nonlexical 
communicative interaction, particularly in doctor-patient relationships. 
17.Lefebvre (199?:63), a disabled person, writes, "The eye of others is where we 
seek the validation of our existence, and this is the yardstick by 'which we judge 
our self-worth. But universal approval, or even acceptance is far less important 
than the consistent love and admiration of a few consistent others". I raise this 
point again in the next section addressing the case of Elizabeth Bouvia in 
'Choosing to Die'. 
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18. The Thorn, a poem written by William Wordsworth in the 18th century raises the 
question of a possible case of infanticide. According to Lionel Rose (1986:7), the 
. . 
practice of infanticide in England continued during the 19th century. In 1869, for 
example, of the 3,979 inquests (autopsies) of children under one year old, nearly 
one-third, were for babies who were 'illegitimate' or 'unknown'. 
19. Lichens are among the oldest appearing plant organisms, first appearing more 
than two billion years ago, according to fossil records. They live in symbiotic 
association. 
20. Plants such as 'Eve's Root', Pennyroyal' and (the now extinct) Silphium were 
used from ancient times to cause abortions or, as Bilger (1998:38) writes, "to 
bring down the courses". 
21. Present throughout much of history, abortion and infanticide have been 
designated as 'women's business'. During Roman times, the only interjections 
occurred when there was a possibility that a male would be deprived of a male 
heir. See: Luker: 1984: 12-13, Shelton: 1988: 56-78. 
22. The official position of the church concerning abortion found its roots in Aquinas. 
Synthesising the arguments of Aristotle into his own (Ford: 1991: 39), the official 
church position did not condemn abortion before 'quickening', a formula of 
'ensoulment' developed by Aquinas (Luker: 1984: 13). 
23. A soldier wrote home to his wife" If it is a boy, let it live; if it is a girl, expose it" 
(Oxyrhynchus Papri 744 quoted in, Shelton: 1988: 28). French (1986:79-80), . 
among others, makes the point that it appears likely during the Roman era that 
more females were subject to infanticide than males. 
24. Third Republic reforms under Napoleon attempted to curb the practice of 
infanticide. A Napoleonic decree in 1811 required all foundling hospitals to have 
a tour, a combination of a revolving door and a container. Defended by 
proponents, it was called humanitarianism, by its opponents it was argued that it 
only promoted abandonment. In early 1800, abandonment reached about five 
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percent of the total birth rate, by 1840, it is reported to have reached as high as 
20-30 percent (Fuchs: 1984: 32). It is also of interest to note that in France before 
1800, both abortion and infanticide were recognised as a form of child abuse 
(ibid). 
25. See Raum, O.F. 1960. Chaga Childhood: A Description of Indigenous Education 
in an East African Tribe. London: Oxford University Press. The Sebei Tribe (East 
Africa, mainly Tanzania) only twenty years ago, according to Goldsmidt (1976: 
244) deny practising infanticide regularly. However, a man may divorce his wife 
if" she has had children three times and kills them each time". 
26. Stanza quoted from The Thorn (Wordsworth: 1979:47). 
27. As pointed out by Tooley (1997:43) there is a tendency in philosophical 
discussions to use the terms 'person' and 'human beings' interchangeably. This 
results in what he calls 'philosophical' confusion' (ibid). Tooley suggests not 
using the term 'human being', but suggests the use of a more neutral expression, 
"characterised in physiological terms, such as member of the species Homo 
sapiens" (ibid: 44). 
28. Robert Wertheimer, quoted in Tooley (1997: 43) says, " Except for monstrosities, 
every member of our species is indubitably a person, a human being, at the very 
latest from birth." As Tooley argues, the terms 'person' and 'human being' 
should be clarified. For Tooley, the concept of a person is," purely a moral 
concept, free from all descriptive content"(ibid: 42). 
29. The atmosphere of Whitechapel road, where Joseph Merrick was 'housed' for 
exhibition is captured in the writings of Blanchard Jerrod in his book, London: A 
Pilgrimage published in 1872. The direct quote, cited in Montagu (1971 : 14-15) is 
as follows: " It is an ancient neighbourhood, as some of the overhanging houses 
proclaim: and it remains a picturesque one, with the infinitely various lines and 
contrivances of the shops and stalls, and gaudy inns and public houses; the 
overhanging clothes, the mounds of vegetables, the confused heaps of fish, all 
cast about to catch the pence of the bonnetless dishevelled women, the heavy 
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navvies, and the shoe less children. The German, the Jew, the Frenchman, the 
Lascar, the swarthy native of Spital fields, the leering thin-handed thief, the bully 
of his court, the silly-Billy of the neighbourhood- on whom the neighbourhood is 
merciless- with endless swarms of ragged children, fill road and pavement." 
30. "It matters not how man behaves towards animals because God has subjected all 
things to man's power." Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II ii Q 64.1 and 11, 
I Q 102, 6. Quoted in Singer (1993 :290). 
31. See Singer: 1993: 292. Concerning the role of religion in culture, an interesting 
perspective is given by Merleau-Ponty: The task of religion seems to be to mark a 
place in our culture for what is foreign and enigmatic, a role that religion carries 
out 'not insofar as it is dogma nor even belief, but as a cry" ( Merleau-Ponty :La 
metaphysique dans I 'homme [1947] quoted in Bannan, 1. 1967. The Philosophy 
of Merleau-Ponty. N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace and World: 175. 
32. The turn to social movements such as those in the areas of animal rights, 
ecology/environment, green policies, peace and peace orientation, anti-nuclear, 
populism, feminism, children-as- soldiers, and a host of other issues are some of 
many born of postmodernism. Postmodernism has called for a greater awareness 
of marginalised people such as those disabled, handicapped, the elderly, and 
generally disadvantaged. In this approach, discussions ranging from formal to 
restorative to distributive justice are raised. New perspectives in bioethics and 
public policy concerning disability, difference, and discrimination are brought to 
the fore. Concern is no longer focused on the state, but calls for a return to the 
subject; small is beautiful, and autonomy is a prerequisite. 
33. Struber (1994) as well as Singer (1993,1994,1996) argues against the 'sanctity of 
life' position both raise this point. Singer terms it the 'Domination Theory' 
(1993 :290-293). 
34. In Britain, it was not until the 19th century that the social status of doctors became 
elevated and concurrently the power of their guilds evolved. Up until that time, 
magistrates and midwives dealt with issues such as infanticide. 
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35. The complex role of medicine as a social. construct and the multitude of roles 
played by agents in and out of this construct cannot be overemphasised. As van 
Niekerk (1998:6) writes, " One of the important implications of the insights that 
the individual patient can and often has to be seen as a representation of a whole 
population is the need to recognise that medicine is as much a social or human 
as a natural science. The reason for that is not only that medicine is active within 
the confines and possibilities of human society. The reason also is that the real 
base of biomedical knowledge testifies to its social dimensions." 
36. The thought concerning making choices under duress is based on the following 
quotation: "It seems that one of the essential features of ethical life is that we run 
into situations where there is no clear right decision, and where we may not 
determine what to count even as the best decision, if we ever do, until we have to 
take some action in the midst of confusion" (Fleishacker: 1992: 1955). 
37. Participating in an ethical dialogue requires self-discipline, self-evaluation, and 
introspection and in this way, strengthens the autonomy of the moral agent. 
Postmodern thoughtwams us that there may be no solution, which poses a 
problem for us as moral agents as well as ' liberation movements trying to 
identify principles on which to base their elaboration of new ethics' (Foucault: 
1982:231). Thus there are no guarantees, but there never were. As Schopenhauer 
puts it, " I am of the opinion that there cannot be either privileged, useful, or even 
harmless errors, but that every error does infinitely more harm than good. On the 
other hand, if it were the intention to make prevailing prejudices the standards of 
truth or the boundary mark beyond which the expounding of truth may not go, 
then it would be more honest to abolish philosophical faculties and academies 
entirely; for that which does not exist should also not appear" (Schopenhauer, 
trans. E.J.F. Payne: 1995: 198). 
38. On the Dock. Pomerance's (1979) play The Elephant Man recreates using 
particularly theatre and church (referring to Merrick's construction of a model of 
St Phillip's Cathedral) a space of interplay where polarities may be overcome. 
Evident in Act III, the form Pomerance uses is one of medical interrogation. 
Roles are switched and Treves takes Merrick's place as medical case being 
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exhibited (referring to both his exhibition to the London Pathological Society and 
as a 'freak' exhibited by his past employers). The conclusion of the play calls 
attention to issues of control and authority and the abuse of power, particularly in 
the telling of our own stories and those of other people's lives. I have adopted this 
interrogative form. 
Some of the anatomical descriptions used by Treves in Merrick's exhibition to the 
London Pathological Society (Montagu: 1971 [appendix)] 24-131) also evident in 
his Reminiscences (ibid: 17-46) are presented as metaphors and analogies. For 
example, describing the size ofrounded exostoses of Merrick's skull he compares 
them to the size larger than a "Tangerine Orange", plus other descriptions such 
as .... "rudimentary trunk or tusk" ... "appearance of a radish" (Graham and 
Oehlschlaeger: 1992: 42). In his case presentation, by emphasising Merrick's 
unaffected body parts, Treves exaggerates differences. And in doing so identifies 
Merrick's biological human kinship as well as distancing him from 'normal' 
humans. It seems that Treves, although finding the words to describe Merrick 
confidently enough, as Graham and Oehlschlaeger: (1992: 17) write he 'almost 
totally sunders Merrick's physical self from his existential condition'. 
39. It was common practice in Europe and the US even up to·the 1960's to 'exhibit' 
patients in amphitheatres as 'cases' with little if any 'informed consent'. 
40. Under ideal circumstances, good medical and ethical practice are grounded in the 
mutual construction of a narrative that will have both explanatory power and. a 
fully realised potential for healing (Hunter: 1994: xi). As Brody (1997:83) 
writes," As the physician moves from the position of technician and information 
source to that of counselor, advisor and friend, the physician acquires relatively 
more power over that relationship and power could be abused. But if we respond 
to the threat of abuse by saying 'physicians should not be counselors, advisors or 
friends,' we deprive patients of relationships that they find supportive and helpful 
in most circumstances and that in many cases actually enhance the patients' 
autonomy." 
What appears lacking in Brody's argument rests on the language used, and the 
meaning of words in language. Doctor-Patient relationships are, like all social 
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relationships, complex. Certainly, the particular circumstance III which a patient 
consults a doctor in and of itself shifts the balance of power to that of the doctor. In 
ethical negotiations with a patient, it is necessary for the doctor to genuinely attempt 
to engage in a dialogue with her, one in which her autonomy is reinforced. In most 
cases, if this is held paramount, as Gillon (1986: 166) writes, "Doctors will benefit 
their patients more if rationale of the proposed beneficial actions is understood and 
approved of by their patients." It follows that the meaning of words used should be 
understood and defined much as possible, and raises some serious considerations: for 
instance, what constitutes a 'friend' to one person may not be the same as what 
'friend' means to another. Language games are heterogeneous and consist in goals 
and values. While these are potentially realisable, they may also conflict. Agents 
learn to operate within the confinements of each relevant language game. Within the 
'game' decisions concerning what is right conduct are identified. One language game 
may differ from another and vary according to changing circumstances. In addition, 
the rules of the language game must remain flexible enough to be revised should the 
need occur (Cilliers: 1998:135-140). 
41. RE: Treves'examples: The appendectomy performed by Treves on the Prince of 
Wales (Edward VII) and the death of his youngest daughter Hetty at the age of 18 
years due to peritonitis from appendicitis are both documented facts (See: 
Trombley 1989:87, Montagu 1971:9, Graham and Oehlschlaeger 1992:33, 
Howell and Ford: 1980: 167). 
42. Treves, according to Graham and Oehlschlaeger (1992:65-66) had a persistent 
habit of referring to Merrick as 'John' rather than 'Joseph', even in his 
Remembrances. This raises such questions as: the meaning of giving him the 
name 'John' or an unfulfilled need on the part of Treves to re-name (thus placing 
himself in the role of a father). The questions remain unanswered: 
43. A phenomenological approach to the relationship of consciousness and nature is 
discussed in detail by J9hn Bannan in his chapter The Relationship of 
Consciousness and Nature. In, The Philosophy oj Merleau-Ponty N.Y.: Harcourt 
Brace Publishers: 27-57. 
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44. In Wilde's story The Happy Prince, a swallow comforts the now commercially 
valueless Prince with tales of wonder and fantasy, "of the King of the Mountain 
ofthe Moon ... ofthe Sphinx as old as the world itself...ofpygmies, always at war 
with butterflies" (Wilde: 1880:96). I decided to end the pygmy-butterfly war. 
45. Defonned or 'nonnal', the fact of being human requires that one be somehow 
embodied. Being embodied, however, is also contingent on which specific body 
parts (complete with their own particular anatomic- physiologic- bio-neurological 
make-up) turn out to be experienced as 'yours' or 'mine'. Being embodied, apart 
from a conditio sine qua non, is also inescapable; whatever one's particular ideal' 
body, wish or desire, their very expressions and stark limitations are defined 
. within the very embodiment one has. For example, whether Merrick liked it or 
not (and he undoubtedly did not like it) there were some activities, sensory 
refinements, gestures not within his bodily scope. He wanted his body to do 
certain things, he probably willed his body to perfonn certain actions, but he 
remained subject to and at the mercy of, his body. He has two arms. Both are his. 
But the afflicted ann 'has' him as much as he 'has' it. The sense of 'having' and 
'being had by' one's body is discussed by Pliigge in Man and His Body (E. Eng, 
Trans.) In, The Philosophy of the Body. 1970. S.F. Spicker (Ed) Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books: 305-307. 
46.As documented (Graham and Oehlschlaeger: 1992:22-23, 116-117, Montagu: 
1971: 66 and Howell and Ford: 1980:156-157,209-210) Merrick had been 
overcome by the weight of his grossly defonned head, while taking a natural 
sleep, it had pressed against his windpipe, causing suffocation. There was, 
though, some discussion in both the London Times and the British Medical 
Journal concerning whether the suffocation was caused by the head falling 
frontward or backwards. According to all accounts, Merrick knew there was no 
cure for his disease. Perhaps, he chose to die. 
47. Miller Williams (1997: 306) identifies in the following poem that, there appears 
to ·be a societal connotation that those differing from the 'nonnal' are somehow 
'bad' and should ask for forgiveness for being born. 
"The Ones that are Thrown Out 
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One has flippers. This one is like a seal. 
One has gills. This one is like a fish. 
One has webbed hands, is like a duck. 
One has a little tail, is like a pig. 
One is like a frog 
With no dome above the e"yes. 
They call them bad babies. 
They didn't mean to be bad 
But who does." 
48. From Lynch's screenplay (1979:112): 
MERRICK: 
"When will the stream be aweary of flowing under my eye? 
When will the wind be aweary of blowing over the sky? 
When will the clouds be aweary of fleeting? 
When will the heart be aweary of beating ... And nature die? 
JOHN'S MUM: 
Never, oh! Never, nothing will die; 
The stream flows, the wind blows, the clouds fleet, the heart beats ... 
Nothing will die." 
To this, I add the following quote from Derrida (1995: 115): "As often happens, 
the call of or for the question, and the request that echoes through it, takes us 
further than the response." 
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ADDENDUM I 
Scanned images of Joseph Merrick from Montagu's book: The Elephant Man: A 
Study in Human Dignity, 1971, pages 85-86, i26-127 and 24-25. 
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SECTION TWO 
SINGER ON THE SLOPE 
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INTRODUCTION TO SECTION II 
In current times the possibilities available to wealthy industrialised nations of actually 
repairing defects, rearranging genes and so on has made the unrestored face or body 
less socially acceptable, stubbornly unhuman. In many ways, ethical issues arising 
from 'those different from us' are culturally relative. At the same time, those born 
with, or who acquire 'difference' will always be a part of our world, as we will be of 
theirs. 
In the industrialised West, those visibly different generally constitute a population in 
. . 
possession of differences that will not respond to available treatment: Yet all those 
different from us, be they in wealthy or poor countries, are resultantly stigmatised. 
Consequently, they are situated within a social structure of the" 'afflicted' - removed 
from normative conventions of social and scientific intervention"(Murphy: 1995:148). 
While important inroads such as vocational training and easier transport have been 
made for those disabled (while having little bearing on those visibly different) they 
represent external aids only. They do not prevent or assuage the pain of looking ugly 
in a society obsessed with physical perfection, where just first impressions count to 
such an extent that they cloud all other aspects of human relationships. 
What is essential for the quality of life of those disfigured or disabled, in Merrick's 
time or ours, is the need for trained sensitivity and awareness on the part of society. 
For society, this means going beyond the body to the agent inhabiting it. For the 
disfigured, this means that, despite their understandable hypersensitivity, they too, can 
by their demeanour and expectations both consciously and unconsciously affect, in 
both positive and negative ways, the quality of human interaction with the non-
disfigured (Macgreagor: 1979: 116). 
In the previous section of this paper, I opened a conversation concerning those 
'visibly different' using the example of Joseph Merrick The Elephant Man. From all 
accounts written concerning his life, I must say I found something endearing in his 
character. I liked him. I believe he enriched the lives of others, just as others enriched 
his life. 
/ 
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In adding to his story, I created a scene in which he, Treves, and Carr Gomm were 
making a model of a mountain. Let us return to look at it. 
The uncompleted mountain sits on Joseph's table. On the right hqrid side it's slope is 
well-formed, gradual, rising and falling. The left-hand side remains unfinished. Ifwe 
were perched on the top of the mountain, looking down we could see the frame: bits of 
cardboard and fragments of wood jutting out at irregular intervals like ledges. The 
glue, now dried, looks shiny, even slippery in appearance. 
The rich metaphor of the slippery slope is one of the most powerful intuitional ideas 
in social science and ethics. In this image, some idea, situation or, as Pence (1995:30) 
writes, "even society as a whole" is imagined as standing perched on the top of a 
mountain slope. Lining the slope are moral principles and ethical tenets envisioned as 
chocks or checks- ledges that prevent the top of the mountain (usually presented as 
the status-quo situation or idea) from falling, capitulating into moral abandonment; 
for at the bottom of the slope waits Dante's 'Inferno', the' River Charon', in other 
words, moral chaos. The argument goes that if we remove one ledge, then we remove 
another, if we remove that chock, we will then remove another, and so on until the 
momentum is such that the slide to amorality is inevitable. 
Slippery slope arguments presuppose a status quo position prohibiting a certain action 
or actions to take place (Den Hartough: 1994: 280). Merrick, deformed and disabled is 
the status quo position. We prohibit the killing of deformed or disabled members of 
our society. I perched him on the top of the unfinished mountain. But now, it is 
proposed that ·we move from the status quo position to a new one, which, as Den 
Hartough (ibid: 281) writes is " the top of the slope, in which A will be considered 
acceptable or be permitted henceforth". 
The slippery slope argument in contemporary voice has been raised by many normal, 
disabled and handicapped people against the hiring (April 1999) of Professor Peter 
Singer to hold the chair of the Ira W. De Camp professorship of Bioethics at Princeton 
University'S Center for Human Values. The slippery slope argument and the basis for 
this dissension is the subject of Section II. 
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SCOPE OF SECTION II 
Part I. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT 
In part one, I outline and discuss the slippery slope argument. 
Part II. WHY ALL THE FUSS? 
In part one of this section, I identify some of the arguments arising from the hiring of 
Singer by Princeton University. Considering the reactions to his appointment, I will 
argue with Singer (l993b: 175) that " the use of the Nazi analogy is utterly 
misleading." 1 Yet, in order to understand the emotion behind Singer's hiring, based 
mainly on fear, I felt it necessary to overview origins of the concept of eugenics. The 
history of the eugenics movement is valuable because it makes so dramatically visible 
cultural judgements that are inevitably part of defining any human difference as a 
disease or a disability subject to removal. In the eugenics overview, I conclude that 
public debates related to Singer's hiring supply the necessary checks and balances 
needed to dissolve the slippery slope and suggest that eternal vigilance is the price 
society must pay not to fall into the abyss of amorality. 
Part III. PETER SINGER'S STANCE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
SLIPPERY SLOPE 
In part three, I overview Singer's stance and identify many ethical issues he has 
opened in challenging the status quo position. 
Part IV. THEORY AND PRACTICE 
In this section, moving from theory to practice, I highlight a few considerations I feel 
should be included in ethical discussions particularly concerning matters of life and 
death. 
Conclusion: MERRICK AND OTHERS MEET SINGER 
In the conclusion, I unite Merrick and other disabled people with Singer thus adding 
contemporary perspectives of some disabled persons to the questions arising from 
bodily difference. I identify that Singer's position does not imply lack of respect for 
people with disabilities, quoting him ( Singer :1993b:189) " The principle of equal 
consideration of interests rejects any discounting of people on grounds of disability." 
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PART I 
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT 
The most common of the two forms' of the 'slippery slope' or 'wedge' (Beauchamp: 
1997:39) argument used by protesters against principally Singer's argument is 
formulated in a valid deductive form (i.e. a string of "if-then" causal claims that lead 
to a conclusion). It would look like this: 
"A" equals a particular group of actions usually questioned as to whether they should 
be legally accepted or morally permitted by society and presupposes a status quo 
position prohibiting "A"(Den Hartogh: 1994:280). Predictably, human behaviour 
suggests that once "A" is accepted as the norm, "B" will be accepted, and so on 
ending in "I". "I" in a slippery slope argument equals Dante's InJerno- or a result 
'beyond the pale' (ibid) that no same or rational human being could endorse. 
Implicitly, then: 
In an extended version of a deductively valid modus tollens, the argument implicitly 
or explicitly would conclude with the rejection of the opening premise: 
A --+ B 
B --+ C 
C --+ I 
-I 
I-A 
However, while deductively valid, in its informal form, the slippery slope argument 
involves causal connections, which, in the case of deductive logic, are not certain. 
This is because the antecedent is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition 
for the truth of the consequent (IF A is true, THEN B must also be true). Considering 
the inductive world referred to in slippery slope arguments, the actual consequences 
remain as unknowns. Slippery slope arguments rely, largely, on an appeal to 
emotions, particularly, fear (such as being cast into Dante's Inferno). 
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As mentioned, slippery slope arguments usually take two forms: an appeal to a 
·prediction about empirical consequences if a moral stance is changed, or a causal 
linkage in reasoning should certain premises be accepted. As Den Hartogh (1994: 
289) writes, "slippery slope arguments ... should rather be taken as expressions of 
allegiance to the moral superiority of the status quo position and should be addressed 
as such". In other words, the question actually concerns the boundaries between the 
status quo and the proposed new position. By aqdressing the language and meaning 
p·er se of the status quo position and through comparing that to the proposed one 
identification of the morality/immorality of a (proposed) action may better be defined. 
This is because the purported links of the causal chain may be. identified ·as 
expressions of the grounds of condemnation, but do not add additional grounds for the 
condemnation of a proposed or actual practice (ibid: 290). 
Supporting this, Beauchamp and Childress (1994:229) also present two versions of 
this argument: the conceptual ("the slope is slippery because the concepts and 
distinctions used in moral and legal rules are vague and may lead to unanticipated 
outcomes") and the psycho-sociological ("the slope is slippery if making exceptions 
to a moral obligation result in permissivity and an erosion of respect for human life"). 
Khuse (1991 :301) also makes the claim that the slippery slope, as a logical argument 
is unconvincing. 
While we may easily sit-back and see that the argument is not logical, why is it that it 
keeps popping up like a Punch and Judy show? Probably the basis rests somewhere in 
the arena of, as Beauchamp (1997:39) writes," judging acts as morally acceptable that 
one cannot support legalising." According to him (ibid: 39-40) "Although particular 
acts of assistance in dying might be morally justified on some occasions, the social 
consequences of sanctioning practices of killing would involve serious risks of abuse 
and misuse and, on balance, would cause more harm than benefit to society." In 
concluding his argument in support of the Oregon legislation 2 as a "promising 
development", he remarks that research should be carried out in coming years to 
determine the benefits and risks of such a trial programme that mayor may not 
succeed (ibid: 40). 
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There is something undeniable in the fearful junction of morally justifying mercy 
killings on one level and the legislation of them on' another. Proponents of the 
deductive model of the slippery slope claim that there appears a ready acceptance of 
"doctors to accept the 'duty' of judging the quality of an patient's life, setting the 
parameters of an acceptable quality, and to act as an executioner when it fails to meet 
their professionally detennined criteria and now it is sanctioned by law " (Smith: 
1997:268). 
PART II 
WHY ALL THE FUSS? 
Professor Peter Singer has challenged a position held since the birth of Western 
philosophy, namely that Homo sapiens are the measure of all things. He provokes and 
confronts us writing (1996: 122) 
" Philosophy as practised in the university today does not challenge anyone's 
preconceptions about our relationship with other species. By their writings these 
philosophers who tackle problems that touch upon the issue reveal that they make the 
same unquestioned assumptions as most other humans, and what they say tends to 
confinn the reader in his or her comfortable speciesist habits". 
This example, one of his many challenges, asks us to consider what it ethically means 
to be at the top of the pecking order, and he argues that we should re-think our place -
in the world. This of course gives rise to a multitude of other questions such as, what 
is it to be a 'person' or a 'human being'. What constitutes our uniqueness, what gives 
us priority over other species? Is it language? Consciousness? Immortal souls? 
Domination-by right? Which animals, if any are people? These examples list only a 
few issues which subsequently give rise to more and enter into threads of numerous 
ethical debates such as: abortion, euthanasia, suicide, the world's resources, animals 
and rights, Homo sapiens and rights, and world hunger, to name only a few. Singer 
had the audacity to challenge our comfortable world. 
There have been numerous rally's held against Singer's appointment in the U.S. as 
well as before and during scheduled guest lectures in various countries (van Niekerk: 
1999). The 'fuss' concerns certain statements, for the most part, taken out of context 
and made social-political platfonns. While it is recognised that to feel something 
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emotionally is not lhe same as to logically and dispassionately argue pro or con an 
ethical point, the power of emotions in the case against Singer are strong. He has 
written, and the following examples are often included in reactions to his writings 
indicating why the debate is so intense: 
" Killing a defective infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person "(Singer: 
1993a: 191). " Even an abortion late in pregnancy for the most trivial reasons is hard 
to condone unless we also condemn the slaughter of far more advanced forms of life 
for the taste of their flesh "(ibid: 1976: 88). "If killing the haemophiliac infant has no 
adverse effects on others, it would be ... right to kill him" (ibid: 1993 b: 186). 
In the protests, conclusions drawn from such statements are usually translated in 
somewhat different terms. For example, Singer advocates murdering (as opposed to 
the philosophically neutral term 'killing') babies (as opposed to severely handicapped 
new-borns). In these emotional responses, his advocating 'murder' also extends from 
'babies' to handicapped adults. 
An Associated Press report (April 1999) wrote that Singer had been gIven the 
nickname, "Dr. Death". How would we react if Dr. Death sneaked the room of Joseph 
Merrick and injected him with a lethal dose of something- or- another just because he 
was deformed and disabled? Actually, if we follow the emotional responses, Singer 
wouldn't even have to sneak into Merrick's room. This is because, simply by 
association, Princeton University must also sanction such practices after all, they hired 
him. To identify this, the following is quoted from a protester (UPS April 17th 1999): 
"This is getting close to Hitler's politics ... Hitler did the same thing in Nazi Germany 
to the deformed and disabled with the support of academics ... judging their lives not 
worth living." Since Princeton University, one of the 'Top-ten' U.S. Ivy-League 
Universities hired him, they must be in collusion with other universities or 
'academics' ... and the 'plot' is so carried back to and must involve goveinment 
intrigues, secret projects and so on. Certainly, while we may agree that logically this 
is not the case, the power of emotions cannot be denied. 
Against Singer's hiring, the example of the abyss of moral degradation to which we 
will all fall should his arguments be accepted is the archetype of Nazi Germany. For 
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example, Rachael Hurst (1999), Chair of the United Kingdom's Disability Awareness 
in Action Group in a letter to Princeton University wrote: 
"In fact, both Singer and other supporters of 'quality adjusted life years' assessments 
are both satisfying their own prejudices and are in direct opposition to the basic 
premise of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that states 'All human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights' ... written as an international response 
to the eugenics of Nazism- an effort to eradicate that attitude forever. The Declaration 
was written by a society who had witnessed massive killings of innocent people and 
the attempted eradication of ethnic minorities ... What Singer and his supporters are 
advocating is eugenics- pure and simple. " ... 
Echoed in writings on disability, Morris (1992: 16) cites three examples of public 
policies that evidence the low-regard in which lives of the disabled are held. The first 
is the American court ruling that it is entirely rational for a person with serious 
impairment to choose to die. 3 The second, British legislation excepting pregnancies 
diagnosed as likely to result in children with disabilities from a prohibition against 
terminating past twenty-four weeks. Lastly, the 1939 German decree authorising 
physicians to accord a mercy death to impaired persons who could not be cured. She 
concludes that,. "Implementation of this program corrupted the moral climate and 
facilitated subsequent stages of the Holocaust" (ibid, my italics). 
Even in the Kevorkian case. the lawyer for the prosecution was reported as saying, 
"There are eleven million souls buried in Europe that can tell you that when you make 
euthanasia a state policy, some catastrophic things evolve from that"( Grace: 1999:41). 
Many disabled persons in wheel-chairs protested against Singer wearing black T-
shirts that said, 'Not Dead ... Yet '. 
OVER-VIEWING THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT 
Concerning the hiring of Singer, proponents of the slippery slope argument would 
tend to reason something like this: Since abortion has been legalised, this has resulted 
in a consequential disvaluation of human life. So the next step is that we kill severely 
disabled new-bor;·;s, then having accepted this position, we will kill slightly disabled 
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new-borns (or blind or deaf or carriers of genetic diseases and so on) once that's 
accepted we will find it easy to kill babies of minorities (those our particular society 
considers racially inferior) and so on. Of course, the argument can be construed in 
many ways, from severely disabled new-borns directly to severely disabled adults. 
The constructions of possible extensions are obvious. Although prejudices concerning 
'those different from us' have been present for aeons, I will begin at the end of the 
18th century in Bri.tain and overview the genealogy of the eugenics movement from 
Britain to the U.S. and Nazi Germany, noting that they largely overlap. I will show 
that while appeals to emotions are strong, the basis of the Holocaust did not begin nor 
end with eugenics. Yet, while arguing that the basis for the Holocaust was not the 
eugenic movement, I will identify certain parallels in speeches and legislation that are 
present in contemporary times. 
Doctors in society 
Deformity, disfigurement, disease, and death were common in urban London during 
the Industrial revolution. In 1869, the average life span of an urban Londoner was 33 
years. Hospitals, while numerous were regarded by the population in general as 
'death houses'. According to McKeown and Brown (1994), all surgery done during 
this period was highly lethal, so the more surgery that was done, the higher the 
mortality rate; institutional confinement was associated with a higher maternal death 
rate based on acquired puerperal infection. Indeed, as we noted in Merrick's story, 
surgeons wore black coats, stiff with the blood of numerous surgical procedures, (the 
stiffer the more prestigious) rarely washed (Graham and Oehlschlager: 1992: 23). It 
follows that not until the basic principles of bacteriology were both understood (a 
development of the last quarter of the 19th Century) and applied in practice could any 
reduction of the death rate through the work of doctors and hospitals be expected. 
The social prestige of doctors, which became established in the 19th century, did not 
extend to the official but inferior rank of health orderlies, and even less to the shady 
world of bonesetters and charlatans (Sournia: 1992: 363). Medicine in general, was 
evolving as a science, and a discipline in its own right. The principles of diagnosing 
diseases and actual disorders were slowly being identified. Yet, the scientific 
knowledge of medicine available at that time was not adequate to handle the 
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calamities of epidemics, war injuries, and a growing population. Ethics, as practised 
in medicine, was based generally on the Hippocratic oath. During this period, doctors 
were gaining a different and subsequently more powerful status in society (van 
Niekerk: 1998: 11). It was of course, white upper class males who held the pos~tion of 
doctors. As their power base grew, as well as quite rapidly the discoveries of science, 
the profession not only was enhanced, but also expanded. A theory which served to 
influence greatly these doctors and the times in which they lived (and often is still 
referred to in contemporary discussions) concerns population growth and food 
production; the writings of Thomas Malthus (1766-1834). 
Malthusian Mixing 
The popUlation of Britain alone increas~d over three-fold between 1800 to 1900, 
despite much immigration (Quinton: 1997: 338). Problems with both increased 
industrialism and a rising population, particularly that of the urban, inflated numerous 
political problems, mainly how to provide for the needs of this new and growing 
urban population as well as how to control them. 
Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) was an English political economist and historian who, 
in 1798 published a book called An Essay on the Principles of Population. This 
publication evoked a reaction against the earlier writings of Godwin, Condorcct, and 
others. They advocated the principles of emancipation and enlightenment which 
ensued after the French Revolution. Coleridge added his voice to the debate criticising 
urban industrialism and debasing the kind of work to which it condemned those 
caught up in it. His influence, reported by Quinton (1997:343), gave impetus to 
changes in political philosophical approaches, carried on by Ruskin and Morris. This 
'humanistic' appeal, influenced by Romanticism resulted in much reflection in British 
thought during the Victorian age. Importantly, Coleridge influenced John Stuart Mill, 
moving him from "bleakly mechanical Benthamism in which he was brought up to 
larger conceptions of the true nature of human happiness and fulfilment"(ibid). 
Institutions such as the 'Poorhouses', 'Asylums:, and 'Workhouses' were created,.to 
some extent in good faith, only to later be condemned for existing. 
Debates raged in the British Parliament such as that presented by Hansard (April 4, 
1879) concerning The Benefit of the Factory Legislation (cited in Flynn: 1978: 130): 
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"What say you, then to children - children of the tenderest years? Why they become 
stunted, crippled, deformed, useless ... I asked for a collection of cripples and 
deformities. In a short time, more than eighty were gathered in a large courtyard. 
They were mere examples of the entire mass. . .. They stood or squatted before me in 
all shapes of the letters of the alphabet. " 
While Hansard made appeals for reform, Lord Chadwick (1803-1890) articulated the 
conditions of the working class in a somewhat different manner. While debating 
against the (now infamous) Poor Laws, Chadwick (cited in Del Col: 1996: 23) issued 
this report. 
RE: The Poor Law Commissioners Inquiry into the Sanitary Conditions of the 
Labouring Population of Great Britain 
"That the younger population, bred under noxious physical agencies, is inferior in 
physical organisation and general health ... that the population so exposed is less 
susceptible of moral influences, and the effects of education are more transient than 
with a healthy population. .. these habits lead to the abandonment of all the 
conveniences and decencies of life, and especially lead to an overcrowding of their 
homes, which is destructive 10 the morality as well as health. .. these adverse 
circumstances tend to produce an adult population short-lived, improvident, reckless 
and intemperate, and with habitual avidity for sensual gratifications. /I 
The influence of Malthus's argument in the writings of Lord Chadwick may be 
identified, although re-interpreted. Malthus proposed that poverty, and therefore by 
association, vice and misery, are unavoidable. They are unavoidable because 
population growth will always exceed food production. The checks and balances on 
population growth, according to his thesis, are wars, famine, and diseases. Malthus 
proposed that through 'sexual abstinence' (directed at the working class) population 
excesses could be diminished and a balance achieved. The atmosphere was such that 
the prevention of solutions to actual social problems were mixed with a often subtle 
leaning towards the idea that an individual was morally responsibility for being poor. 
The shift of moral responsibility for poverty was, then, directed from policy makers to 
the 'lower' social classes and promoted repressive legislation that worsened the 
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conditions of the poor in England (Kelly: 1969: 354). It was reasoned that better 
working conditions for the poor only encourage them to propagate. 
Darwin's Influence 
While the British Empire expanded (concurrently with enthusiasm and obsession at 
home for things, people and plants labelled 'exotic'), the British upper classes 
concerned themselves with 'total health'. Mens sana in corpore sano was a dominant 
concept for the Victorians, as important in shaping thought about human growth and 
conduct as nature was to the Romantics (Flynn: 1978: 44) .. The publication of 
Darwin's Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection or The Preservation of 
Favoured Race In the Struggle for Life in 1859 mixed, mingled, and influenced the 
culture of the times. His publication plus several other factors coincided giving the 
body a special conceptual prominence in 19th Century thought. In 1871, he published 
a second text, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, based on his 
original work but addressing only Homo sapiens. Darwin, a naturalist, concluded that 
in both physical and physiological behaviour there was no difference between man 
and other mammals. He also unfortunately attempted to explain that in social 
development, man struggled for existence and selection through natural means- and 
"attempted, although he was a humanist and well meaning,. to apply a biological 
solution to philosophical social problems" (Nesbitt: 1982: 342). 
It was also in the early 19th century that physiology, once incorporated into the broad 
discipline of anatomy, became a separate science and offered the promise that laws of 
life could be learned in their relationship to human beings. The emphasis was placed 
on the body whole, or what Charles Singer has called a 'synthetic study', organs 
viewed in relationship to other organs. The emergence of 'physiological psychology' 
together with the rise in interest in the actions of man based on psychological or 
psychiatric approaches also gained momentum. 
Galton's Appropriation 
At this juncture, Francis Galton (1822-1911), a half-cousin of Darwin, attempted to 
merge human mental abilities with heredity. Reportedly (Nesbitt: 1982: 48) 'an erratic 
thinker unable to complete research in any area over a sustained period of time', 
Galton extended Darwin's theory of natural selection into a concept of deliberate 
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social intervention, which he held to be the logical extension of evolution to the 
human race. He decided that an optimum human race could be best achieved through 
"selective breeding" (ibid: 67), accomplished through social intervention. This he 
called 'eugenics' the principle of which was that through encouraging better human 
stock to be bred (and conversely discouraging the breeding of less desirable stock) the 
whole 'race' of Englishmen would be improved. In England, this movement resulted 
in a pseudo-science called 'Social Darwinism'. Social Darwinism may be viewed as 
an odd-mixture of excerpts from Malthus' population theory fused with extrapolations 
from Darwin's evolutionary theory, mainly centred on Spencer's earlier phrase, 
"survival of the fittesf', preferred, allegedly even by Darwin over his own 'term 
"natural selection'" (ibid: 97). 
To add to the movement, Britain, in its expansion of Empire, was caught up in the 
psychological- social appeal of things and people 'different'-'exotic'. Samples, 
objects, flora, fauna, as well as humans were exhibited as fascinating images of things 
not understood, alien and thus often deemed inferior; a mirror by which the English 
measured their own self-esteem. This amalgamation gained increasing momentum 
with demands for social legislation in accordance with the principle of 'the fittest 
must survive'. Together, those 'defective' (physically and socially) were being 
defined through eugenics, aesthetics and mass-culture- eugenics as a movement had 
begun (Kevles: 1995: 32). In Germany, Alfred Ploetz became the leader of this 
movement and drawing from various sources added the concept of racial hygiene into 
the already-becoming complex issue of eugenics. 
The Concept of 'Racial Hygiene ' 
The modern development of the concept of 'racial hygiene' may be traced to a 
Frenchman, Count Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) who published a work titled 
"Essay on the Inequality of Human Races" in 1855 (Friedman: 1965: 32). Although 
he wrote in a romantic fashion, creating a fair-haired Aryan race superior to all others, 
his work did not claim for the superiority of any particular fair-hared race, nor did he 
denigrate other racial groups (ibid: 97). Influenced by Marx, the gist of his writings in 
fact reflected class differences, the aristocracy versus the proletariat. Yet, portions of 
his text were appropriated and distorted to fit a particular theory- that of racial 
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superiority. His work, reported by Simpson (1964: 341), went generally unnoticed in 
France but was quite popular in Germany. 
In 1890, Gobineau' s book was revised and translated. This met with such enthusiasm 
that in 1894 the Gobineau Association was founded in Munich Germany (ibid: 74). At 
this time, the Pan-Germans, an anti-Jewish group supporting strongly German 
nationalism rose in power. One of their members was an Englishman name Houston 
S. Chamberlain who held German citizenship. In 1899 he published a book in both 
German and English called "The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century". Departing 
from the style of Gobineau, he held the German race to be the purest form 'of 
Aryanism and damned as inferior Jews, Gypsies and Negroes. (Mosse: 1997: 121). 
Aryans, he purported, were responsible for all great Western cultures of the past, 
which had declined because of racial mixing. Racial mixing was. to be condemned by 
all means, racial hygienics maintained. Eugenics, Social Darwinism and Racial 
Hygiene now merged and from the 1900's various Eugenics societies rose up in 
Europe, Britain and the U.S.A. (Kevles: 1995: 4). 
Sequencing eugenics: the rise of nationalism. 
The strong nationalistic movement in Germany gave impetus to the eugemcs 
movement. Lazare (1995: 45) gives an example of this: In 1900 a contest was held by 
one of its eugenic societies for the best essay on the subject 'What can we learn from 
the principles of Darwinism for application to inner political development and the 
laws of the state?' The winner interpreted culture, society, and morality in terms of 
the struggle for survival. Society, he claimed, must enforce laws to prevent the white 
races from degenerating to the level of "aborigines". This degeneration was 
unavoidable as long as society continued to pander to the physically and mentally 
weak. Among his other points was a "suggestion that a panel of doctors be present at 
the birth of each child to judge whether the child was fit enough to live, and, if not, 
kill it. " 
Hardly confined to Germany, the Eugenics movement not only took hold in Europe, 
Britain, and America, but also branched out to include other disciplines. Particularly 
important was the influence of 'Mental Hygiene' on the fledgling disciplines of 
psychiatry and psychology (Kevles: 1995:89). Well meaning, many of these societies 
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attempted to provide improved treatment for mental patients. It was, perhaps in their 
enthusiasm that a further role was perceived, the safeguarding of the public's mental 
health by weeding out the unfit. To the extent that these organisations and thoughts 
grew, contingent on their particular political, cultural and historical period, so grew 
their sphere of political influence (Lazare: 1995:56). 
Legislating eugenics: Sterilisation. 
Laws of a general nature provided for the establishment of institutions and colonies 
that served to isolate the mentally ill from the rest of the population, thus facilitating 
both control and prohibition of procreation. Examples of two such laws are Britain's 
Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 and the South African Mental Disorders Act of 1916 
(Simpson: 1964: 81). Other laws were more definite and defined such as the 
Sterilisation Acts for the insane in the United States, passed by many States during the 
early 1900's. From sterilisation of the insane further writings indicate a movement 
towards social sterilisation on different grounds, often politically biased. Not to be 
outdone, similar statements were heard from other countries. Reported in 'Periodical 
Notes' in The Birth Control Review (1925),Volume IX, Number 6 (June) is the 
following quotation: " Far more conservative of the proposition to regulate the stream 
of life at its source is Birth Control. Sterilisation of the unfit is actually law in many 
places. And now Denmark proposes euthanasia and has introduced into its parliament, 
according to press dispatches, a bill which would provide that the attending physician 
shall have the power to put painlessly to death an infant who is hopelessly deformed 
or mentally." This proposed bill did not pass through Parliament. With the exception 
of Germany, in general, movements concerning legislation of sterilisation fell out of 
favour in most countries by the late 1920's. 
Legislating eugenics: Euthanasia 
Euthanasia, by definition 'easy death' in common understanding suggests its usage as 
a painless peaceful death for someone incurable and terminally ill. 
As we earlier mentioned, Alfred Ploetz introduced Social Darwinism and founded in 
Germany, the Racial Hygiene movement. In his book, Fundamental Outline of Racial 
Hygiene he argues for the elimination of counter- selective processes, or processes 
such as war and legislation protecting the weak or ill (Simpson: 1964:88). As an 
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illustration, he gives the example of a couple who produced a malformed child. A 
Board of Doctors, he recommends, should give the child, an easy death with an 
overdose of morphine (ibid). Proposals were put forth in Germany for the legislation 
_ of euthanasia in 1921 and 1922, however they were rejected. In 1935, a French-
American Nobel laureate, Dr. Alex Carrel published a book titled Man the Unknown. 
According to Simpson (Lazare: 1995: 95), within three years it was translated into 
nine different languages and appears to have been widely supported by eugenic 
societies operating in Britain, the U.S. and the Continent. In this book, euthanasia is 
directly linked to the eugenics movement. He writes (quoted in ibid: 96): 
"Those who have murdered, robbed while armed with automatic pistol or machine 
gun, kidnapped children, despoiled the poor of their savings, mislead the public on 
important matters, should humanely and economically be disposed of in small 
euthansic institutions supplied with proper gases. A similar treatment could be 
advantageously applied to the insane, guilty of amoral acts ... Philosophical systems 
and sentimental prejudices must give way before such a necessity. The development 
of the human personality is the ultimate purpose of civilisation." 
Hitler's Germany 
We have so far in a broad outline sketched the eugenics movement noting that it was 
evidenced throughout the much of Western thought. Without a deep investigation into. 
the social-economic and political climates of the countries in which eugenics as a 
movement peaked, suffice to say that the overview is incomplete, beyond the scope of 
this addendum. For those disabled, because the Nazi analogy is often used as final end 
of the slippery slope, we will now jump much time and events and focus on Hitler's 
Germany. 
When Hitler left Vienna he was much influenced by the Pan-German' movement, was 
a confirmed anti-Semite and a sworn enemy of Marxist ideology. Largely, his views 
reflected radical Social Darwinism, viewed as a situation in which individuals as well 
as groups were engaged in an endless struggle for superiority, and thus, power. 
In Mein Kampf, familiar arguments appear such as the struggle of life forms for 
survival, the victory of the strong over the weak, ruthless disregard for the notion of 
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rights, the 'Jewish menace' to name only a few. Before Hitler assumed power it was 
illegal to perform sterilisation for 'eugenic' reasons. After gaining office in 1933, 
various laws were enacted which lent support to the eugenic and mental hygiene 
movements (Rathbome: 1999: 74). An important law passed only four months after 
Hitler assumed power was called the "Law for the Prevention of Hereditary Disease in 
Posterity" (Ehrhardt: 1965: 115). 
The categories of people under this law were: 
1. "Anyone suffering from a hereditary disease could be sterilised by means of a 
surgical procedure if it could be expected with some certainty, according to the 
experience of medical science, that his posterity would suffer from a serious 
physical or mental hereditary disease. 
2. Persons would be considered as hereditarily diseased in the sense of this law if 
they suffered from anyone of the following disorders: innate mental deficiency, 
Schizophrenia, Manic-depressive insanity, Hereditary epilepsy, Hereditary 
Huntington's chorea, Hereditary blindness, Hereditary deafness, and lor Severe 
hereditary physical abnormality. 
3. Further, persons could be sterilised who suffer from severe alcoholism" (ibid). 
Further legal enactment's took place and in November 24th 1933, "habitual offenders 
against public morals" were added to the list of those to be castrated. Importantly, the 
Nazi definition of offenses against habitual offenders of public morals included those 
found guilty of" racial pollution" (ibid: 124). 
Prior to 1933 anti-Jewish acts had no legal basis under the Constitution, although they 
occurred. However in 1935, the Nuremberg Laws came into effect and as the Reich 
their subjects were divided. Some were made citizens with full political rights, others 
were classified as subjects of the State. Based on 'racial' and ideological grounds, 
these laws placed the Jews beyond the boundaries of political rights (Mosse: 
1997:99). In addition, in the same year a law was passed called the Blood Protection 
Law, based on protection of 'racial purity' (Hilberg: 1961 :42). A claim is made by 
some writers (Simpson, Nesbitt) that the Nazis began their eugenics on small minority 
groups such as the Freemasons and Jehovah's Witness. Because of the relatively small 
movement of eugenics starting with essentially voiceless minorities, it is postulated 
(Mosse: 1997: 55) that the Jews, declared scapegoats, and the largest group not 
holding political rights, held onto a belief that it would never be their 'tum'. At this 
67 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
time the momentum of the eugenics movement had not reached its full force and there 
was a possibility, should the Jews have been declared 'targets' in the first 'exercise' 
the outcry would have thwarted the Nazi's purpose (Hilberg: 1961: 67). 
Hilberg asserts that sterilisation and euthanasia were not the original ideas of the 
Nazi's. They were ideas that were both supported and promoted throughout the world 
by numerous eugenic societies. Germany was the only country in which the social-
political-economic climate was such that the materialisation of the final goals of 
eugenics was, most horrifically, realised. 
The Fray and its Consequences 
It was, of course, necessary in the political climate of Nazi Germany to have 
scapegoats. These were the Jews. Anti-Semitism however was not confined to 
Germany alone as I identify in the following summary. 
The oldest theology of all - that of the ancient Greeks who invented the word, was 
based on the attempt to rationally reflect the cosmos, creation, and man's role in the 
world. This contrasted with the mythical expressions of belief held during that time. 
Throughout history, cultures have risen and fallen in which their belief systems have 
been based on different things, such as God, witches, in spectral sightings, totems or 
trees. Societies have come and gone in which beliefs, such as a person's race 
determines moral and intellectual properties, that slaves and women have no rights, 
that three claps of the hands are required to summon the gods, and that Jews are evil 
were tenets. Beliefs such as these and many, many more were held as articles of faith. 
Many of these beliefs are now considered unreasonable and have vanished. Many 
remaIn. 
Beliefs are necessary for~!Jeople to define the social order and their role in it. Beliefs 
serve as guides and sources of inspiration, or as ways of reshaping, when necessary, 
the social order. Belief systems are part of the natural world, prescribed to by many as 
unquestioned articles of faith, traditionalised into the fabric of society (Cohn-Sherbok 
& Cohn-Sherbok: 1997: 4). Particular embedded beliefs served as axioms, 
unquestioned norms, no more likely to be doubted than fundamental notions. These 
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notions, so embedded, became essentially unnoticed, concealed from view, excluded 
as a part of society's conversation. With very few exceptions, individuals accept their 
society's cognitive beliefs and values, spoken as words or unarticulated as symbols as 
part of their own being. These cognitive models, of which people may be vaguely 
aware or totally unaware, effect all aspects of human relations. The orders and 
patterns of our culture and society, like our language, become imprinted in our minds 
as children- these patterns are all our developing minds have to draw upon. As we 
mature, these models often tend to guide our behaviour and they are territorial. 
Anti-Semitism may be assumed to have both the status and properties of a cognitive 
model. However, the subject remains underdeveloped. This is a consequence of the 
mind's programming in setting apart the Jews as radically different from all other 
people, needing particular concepts to define and label them, and unique ways of 
treating them. This is so because the treatments and concepts used when dealing with 
other peoples or people would not apply and do not apply to Jews (ibid: 22). This 
leads us to ask why people were so influenced and/or to identify- the source of the 
malefic qualities assigned to the Jews. The reasoning behind the Jews' supposed 
perniciousness varies from the mundane to the imaginary. Is it based on religion, 
ethnic group, strange physical propensities, and special powers? For the roots and 
contents of this phenomena must be understood three fold: as an expression by a non-
Jewish culture, as a permanent feature of Christian civilisation, and in socio-political 
conditions- which by their differing natures, dependent on the time, either saw an 
increase or a decrease in the expression of anti-Semitism (Lazare: 1995: 96). 
Anti-Jewish agitation has existed for several thousand years. Jews were deported to 
Babylon twice, in 597 BC and again in 586 BC. During the time of the ancient 
Roman Empire, Jews were not regarded as citizens. But the timeline of the advent of 
Christianity is perhaps, the most significant point. 
Jesus of Nazareth was born in Bethlehem, a city in Judea. He was a Jew. His 
followers were also Jews. His teachings diverged from the mainline Judaic 
teachings, one premise being that a Messiah would come and a prophecy 
would be fulfilled. Jesus' followers believed him to be the promised Messiah. 
Jews had an opportunity to join this school of thought. The majority rejected 
the claim. For his political and social activities, Jesus was called to trial. 
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Pontius Pilate, a Roman, convening the trial, chose to be politically expedient-
he washed his hands of the matter. In d"oing so, the decision for life or death 
was left to the mob. The people composing the mob were Jews. Their 
decision prevailed. Jesus, in keeping with the common mode of execution of 
that era, was crucified. The Jews killed the Messiah. The Jews killed Christ. 
During the first three centuries of this era, Christianity became increasingly powerful. 
The Edict of Milan, in 313 AD gave Christians rights under the Empire. After 
Constantine, Emperor of Rome converted self and empire to Christianity, antagonism, 
and later persecution of the Jews became commonplace (Cohn-Sherbok and Cohn-
Sherbok: 1997: 34). St. Peter, one of Christ's original twelve disciples, keeper of the 
"Keys to the Kingdom of God", had earlier become the first Bishop Of Rome. Each 
subsequent Roman Bishop was regarded as his successor in rights, duties, obligations 
and privileges- the theory of Apostolic Succession was established. Pope Adrian I, 
dying in 795 AD, formalised the temporal powers of the papacy. From the time of St. 
Peter (± 64 AD) the church was constructing an institution of power and authority. 
Integrated in their theology, from the fourth century AD, and probably before, Jews 
were labelled as the killers of Christ. In addition, the thorough antipathy towards the 
Jews took on almost protean quality- beliefs about Jews became integral to the moral 
order of a Christian society (ibid: 77). All charges against them became both possible 
and plausible. 
In Western Europe, imperial authority, ending with the fall of Rome in the 5th century, 
set the church on a path that supported a variety of relationships between church and 
state- both political and ecclesiastical. During the Dark Ages and Islamic conquest of 
Palestine, there was little threat to the Pauline church of Gnostic heresy affecting its 
doctrines. Jews specifically had been theologically addressed as early as in the third 
century and this continued throughout the church's history (ibid: 72). 
During the medieval age, the church was successful in its" Gentilisation" of Jesus. 
According to Cohn-Sherbok and Cohn-Sherbok (l997:77)."He was no longer 
confused with the Jewish Messiah who would have followed the path of an Essene 
Gnostic, upholding, as he should, the Mosaic laws of his forefathers thus fulfilling the 
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prophecy. Jesus, was no longer a Jew- he was the Christ who had languished at the 
hands of the Romans, but whose destruction had been sealed by the duplicity of the 
Jews." With a uniform and concise reconstruction of the life and passion of Jesus, the 
church texts and theology reigned supreme. With the increase in political control, the 
influence of the church on society was mighty. 
Because the plebeians were generally ignorant and oppressed, it was expedient for the 
church to give them a source· of evil on which to ventilate- something that could 
occupy their minds. In the middle of the 11 th century, the English conducted anti-
Jewish campaigns resulting in the fact that during 1290 - 1656 there were virtually no 
Jews in England (Lazare: 1995:43). Yet, even without the physical presence of Jews, 
their images remained akin to reality, because it was taught so. The Jews were Devil 
followers, if not the personification of the Devil itself. They were guilty of every 
imaginable horrible deed and act, guilty of every natural disaster that could be 
conceived. This became part of the belief system, then an axiom, handed down from 
generation to generation throughout Europe, with or without ever having seen or 
personally known a Jew. 
In 1090, the church launched its First Crusade (De Villenardouin and De Joinville: 
1963:55). The purpose was to free Jerusalem and concurrently, to expand the 
economic and political power of the church. One group suffered grievously from the 
mad enthusiasm that followed the call to arms by Pope Urban III. These were the 
original occupants of Jerusalem and Judea, now also dispersed throughout the 
Western kingdoms- the Jews. If heretics were accorded a trial, the Jews received 
none. 
The history of the First Crusade, one of five launched by the church, encapsulated the 
influence of the church in its determination to expand its will _. and to provide 
convenient scapegoats (ibid: 81). The position of the Jew and the Roman Catholic 
Church remained status quo for many years. Jews were put to the test under the 
Inquisition, pogroms took place in many cities, and towns and the activities of Jews 
were economically restricted. Jews were forced to wear identifying marks or 
garments, usually of a yellow colour. (These visual acts of intolerance had their roots 
historically in the Code of Omar I of Mesopotamia- 637 AD [Lazare: 1995: 12]). 
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Under Roman Catholic monarchs in the 1 t h - 14th centuries, persecution of Jews was 
the rule. Mobs would unleash fury at those held responsible for the martyrdom or 
Jesus. During the Fourth Lateran Council, Pope Innocent III proclaimed an official 
policy of restrictions against the Jews. Throughout all Europe, Jews were despised, 
forced to live outside the confines of respectable society. The Black Death was solely 
the responsibility of the Jews who had poisoned wells, spread the plague- this was 
common knowledge. During the 16th century, Jews had found temporary refuge in 
Poland and Russia, both Christian countries. Later in that century, the brief reprieve 
was ended with renewed persecutions, chiefly instigated by the Cossacks of the 
Ukraine, but readily accepted by Russia and Poland as a whole. Jews were barred 
from craft guilds, agronomy, professions, and large mercantile enterprises- they lived 
by small commerce. 
The Protestant Reformation, successful in challenging the tenets of the Roman 
Catholic Church, brought enlightenment to many- but by that time anti-Semitism was 
already such a common ingrained practice that the thought of questioning intolerance 
was never even conceived (Cohn-Sherbok and Cohn-Sherbok: 1997: 91). In the 18th 
and 19th centuries in Europe, as the rise of modern nation-states evolved, there was a 
gradual separation of church and state. The extent of the separation varied from 
country to country. The cycle of overt Jewish oppression was generally lessened 
during these centuries. However, until the time of Vatican II, in the "Great 
Intentions", a prayer dutifully recited by Roman Catholics for centuries, there was 
only one group of people qualified as "perjides"- betrayers, traitors, apostates, 
conspirators, deceivers, renegades, tricksters- the Jews. By qualifying Jews as 
perjides, the church was. inexorably spun in the perpetuation of anti-Semitism (ibid: 
21). Jews were encouraged to migrate to England and the American Colonies. The 
French government enfranchised them in keeping with the democratic concepts of the 
French Revolution. This was the Age of Enlightenment. 
With the formation of the German Empire in 1871, legal discrimination on the 
grounds of religious practice was adopted. However, persecution, not legally based on 
religion, could take place based on race. Therefore, the Jews became a race. While 
they were a 'race', they remained subjects of the State which gave them some 
privileges- abandoned when the Nazi's came to power. During the years leading up to 
72 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
the Second World War, no religious body, the Roman Catholic Church, the Protestant 
Churches, the Greek and Russian Orthodox churches, the Muslims or any others 
entered the arena shouting loudly against the prevalent theme of persecution of the 
Jews (ibid: 125). 
IF's and THEN's - Any need to worry? 
Protesters against Singer's hiring are say that he advocates eugenics. IF eugenics is 
accepted, THEN the final result will be another Holocaust. I have very briefly 
overviewed the eugenic movement. It has hopefully become clear that shifts and 
mixes, resulting in the Holocaust were dependent on many factors such as: the 
complex interactions of a twisted yet charismatic leader, a particular social-economic 
climate, an erosion of the principles of Justice within a political-legal system, deeply 
embedded assumptions of Jews as non-beings, and, fitting nicely into the whole, the 
particularly egoistic appeal of eugenics. The ethical question we are obliged to ask is 
if there is a need to be concerned. In other words, if Singer's stance is accepted, viz. 
the killing of disabled new-borns, then will societal disvaluation of disabled or 
deformed adults become so pronounced that it will then sanction their killing as well? 
If we only look at the surface, we may see threads in the history of eugenics echoed in 
contemporary times. An example that comes to mind is Singer's (1993a: 191) 
statement: "Killing a defective infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person" 
compared to America's Dr. Henry Haiseldon who, from 1915-1918 "electrified the 
nation by allowing the deaths of at least six infants he diagnosed as defectives" 
(Pernick: 1997: 89). Yet, threads echoed on the surface do not necessarily reflect 
reality. I suggest the bottom line lies in Foucault's admonition, of all things, regard 
them as dangerous- yet remain pessimistically optimistic. The loud outcries emanating 
from the hiring of Singer represents, I have argued, a fear articulated from those 
'different from us'. And perhaps the fear concerning a supposed slippery slope fall to 
eugenics are' captured in the words of Thomas Nagel (1970: 146): 
"To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something basic to human 
nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men are basically complicated; how 
good they are depends on whether certain conceptions and ways of thinking have 
achieved dominance, a dominance that is precarious in any case. The manner in which 
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human beings have conducted themselves so far does not encourage optimism about 
the moral future of the species." 
The price to pay for the precariousness of dominance, of power, is eternal vigilance. 
PART III 
PETER SINGER'S STANCE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE SLIPPERY 
SLOPE 
Peter Singer, a contemporary utilitarian, argues against two specific theses. The first is 
the simple Benthamitemoral equating of humans and other sentient animals and what 
he calls a prejudice based on 'speciesism'. Species ism is a neologism attributed to 
Richard Ryder. Its intended usage is a pejorative, similar to racism and sexism 
(Gillon: 1996:47). Using the example of pain and suffering, Singer argues that" pains 
of the same intensity and duration are equally bad whether felt by humans and 
animals"(Singer: 1976: 19). The grounding of different human moral rights and moral 
evaluations in Singer's thesis are based on the human's possession of differing 
interests. Such are: the capacity for self-awareness, ability to plan for the future, 
ability to have relationships with other humans, close family and personal ties, the 
importance to other affected human beings, plus other attributes such as the capacity 
for abstract thought and complex communication (1993a: 283-286). A member of a 
species possessing these qualities, claims Singer, may be considered more valuable 
than lives that do not possess such qualities. However, all sentient beings, while 
differing in sort of qualities, do possess moral qualities. 
The possession of these qualities as befitting a utilitarian position, does not undermine 
the principle that in making moral decisions the interests of all sentient beings 
affected by the decision must be taken into equal account. Illustrating this point, 
Singer writes: " mere membership of our biological species cannot be a morally 
relevant criterion ... A chimpanzee, dog or pig, for example, will have a higher degree 
of self-awareness and a greater capacity for meaningful relations with others than a 
severely retarded infant or someone in a state of advanced senility. So if we base the 
right to life on these characteristics we must grant these animals a right to life as good 
as, or better than, such retarded or senile humans. "(lbid: 22). 
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This debate gives rise to others such as the concept of human fetal viability, personal 
identity, and 'personhood' among others: a lacuna in ethics as a whole and medical 
ethics in particular. Thus, Singer, by challenging the status quo position, is inexorably 
drawn into the slippery slope argument. 
For example, continuing from this debate is the argument against the legalisation of 
voluntary euthanasia. This form asserts that, " although some acts of euthanasia may 
be morally permissible ... , to allow them to occur will set a logical precedent for, or 
will causally result in, consequences that are morally repugnant" (Battin: 1994:n25: 
115). The major point stressed in such arguments is that, for example, since abortion 
became legalised in many countries there has been a decline in the value and respect 
for human life. Now, if voluntary euthanasia were to be legally permitted, then it 
would lead to an even further decline in respect for human life. If voluntary 
euthanasia was to be permitted then involuntary euthanasia would be the norm and so 
on- no chocks, no checks, no balances: the Inferno of Dante waits. C. Everett Koop, 
once U.S. Surgeon General, wrote (1977: 538) that allowing brain- damaged infants to 
die would create a slippery slope. In his view, it would result in the killing of other 
impaired new-borns further resulting that killing would occur in cases such as, "all 
people with neurological defects after automobile accidents." 
This well illustrates the slippery slope intuition that once handicapped infants are 
deprived of a right to life other infants and handicapped people are at risk, ultimately 
all of the human race or portions of the human race deemed 'unfit' for whatever 
reason. Such fears are currently articulated from a variety of 'undervalued' groups 
such as the disabled, disfigured, the elderly, minorities, and other groups traditionally 
discriminated against. Indeed, the role of aesthetic judgements in the definition of 
disease and disability remain controversial issues in applied ethics today. Should laws 
protecting the disabled against discrimination apply to those who are simply judged 
unattractive? Do aesthetic values create disability in the same way as stair-steps or 
other physical barriers do to a wheel chair confined person? I suggest that the history 
of eugenics identifies the futility of trying to open such questions by seeking to draw a 
sharp line between '''objective' physical cause and 'subjective' values. Anytime a 
culture defines disease or causation, it makes a partial subjective, value-based 
judgement" (Pernick: 1996: 56). Greater awareness, then, of the inevitability of the 
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value-based components in these ethical questions mayor may not help in reaching 
more ethical judgements. However, by pretending that such judgements can ever be 
made without values only de-legitimates and prevents the critical analysis of the 
implicit values at stake. This calls, then, for a continuous open and democratic society 
where issues are raised, no matter from what platform in a multitude of different 
voices. In doing so, the ethical debate becomes richer and the slippery slope in fact 
takes the form of an ethical watchdog. 
PART IV 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
As identified, there are numerous ethical Issues arising from Singer's stance. 
Considering rising and revisited biomedical issues, I believe we may say that his 
views have served to increase ethical dialogues on a wealth of issues. Yet, thinking 
reflecting and writing theory does have a tendency to remove the philosopher from 
real world situations. A few of which are identified below. 
A few problems between theory and practice 
Theorists, mainly all removed from clinical practice, present to those in the medical 
field, (many working on the ground) arguments concerning matters of life and death. 
Ethical theories, it is argued, well may provide answers to questions clinicians face 
when faced with moral dilemmas concerning 'difficult choices'. While I personally 
subscribe on a theoretical level to Singer's position, I argue that praxis presents a 
different face: that those who agree with Singer's position ought to be able to actually 
perform the action they theoretically support. I wonder if they would be able to do so. 
To illustrate this, I offer the following examples for thought: 
'\, 
1. Theorists can not be held legally liable for the performance of actions they, for 
example argue as ethically correct: "To summarise: passive ways of ending life 
result in a drawn-out death. They introduce irrelevant factors (a blockage in the 
intestine, or an easily curable infection) into the selection of those who shall die. 
If we are able to admit that our objective is a swift and painless death, we should 
not leave it up to chance to determine whether this objective is achieved. Having 
chosen death we should ensure that it comes in the best possible way" (Singer: 
1993b: 213). 
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"A year or so later, Dr. Kevorkian was first successfully prosecuted for assisting in 
the death of his seventeenth patient, Thomas Hyde, a 30 year old man in' the last 
stages of Lou Gehrig's disease (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis)"(Pence: 1997: 23). In 
this case, he was acquitted. Later, in 1999, assisting in another death, he was found 
guilty of second-degree murder (Grace: 1999:41). Could, would ethicists such as 
Singer and Tooley be willing to take on the legal network? The practice of medicine 
is a social construct, responsible to and created by society. The practice of ethics 
follows the same mandate. Ethicists, I suggest, ought to include in their scope of 
practice, greater consideration of the problems faced by agents when theory IS 
practically applied. 
2. In addition, the injunctions of law are contingent on cultural variables, for 
example: " ... if children are dying, incurable, and in great pain, the Royed Dutch 
Medical Association has accepted that they have a right to die, even if their 
parents object "(Pence: 1985: 146). 
In the U.S., under the 1984 amendment to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
Act of 1974, non-treatment in Baby Doe cases constitutes child abuse. These 
amendments, signed into law by Ronald Regan in October of 1984, circumvented the 
injunction against the Baby Doe rules. This removed the federal government 
somewhat from the arena, and placed the responsibility on individual states. While 
different states have different laws regarding issues ranging from assisted suicide, 
choosing to die, and the treatment level extended to all but the most hopeless cases of 
severely impaired new-boms (Pence: 1994: 198), perhaps the most controversial is the 
State of Oregon's Death with Dignity legislation (see note 4). How many acts have in 
one historical period and culture been morally condemned as wrong, only in another 
time and space to be judged as right! 
4. Nor are they actually placed in the position of being bodily present at the time of 
euthanasing, letting die, or killing: " ... killings require that acts of persons be the 
causes of death. Accordingly, a natural death occurs when a respirator is 
removed, because natural conditions simply do what they would have done 
without the respirator "(Beauchamp: 1997:35). 
'\ 
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Schiedermayer (1999:74) illustrates this in his personal clinical confrontations with 
patients requesting to die. Concerning his fourth example he writes: 
" I consent on a ventilator-dependent quadriplegic man who refuses to be weaned so 
that he might die more easily when his ventilator is stopped. He is looking for a 
physician who is willing to stop his ventilator. The spinal cord unit physicians refuse 
to do this. In addition, the patient requests that he be not suctioned once the ventilator 
is removed. I offer to see him, but it is a mistake. The moment I see him I know 1 
can't do what he wants. He doesn't have his talking trachea in but I don't have to hear 
what he says. He whispers, Help me, come back later ... 1 can't accept him in transfer. 
But my friend does, without any real qualms. The patient dies two days after the 
withdrawal of the ventilator, with a high fever and aspiration pneumonia. It was all 
the noises in the dying 1 remember: the rasping, the bubbles, the whimpering-
suffering." Well known to all, not all deaths, human or animal, are easy deaths. They 
may be even planned to be 'easy, gentle deaths' and all the equipment and humans 
necessary to 'make it gentle' may well be there, yet nature is capricious. 
Conclusion 
MERRICK AND OTHERS MEET SINGER 
Complaints against ethical arguments raised by Singer and many others have been 
perceived and interpreted in a different manner by those disabled. For example, 
Silvers (1998:3) a disabled philosopher writes, 
"The grounding of the question asking whether profoundly impaired neonates should 
live tests how much we value human life itself, as distinct from what individuals 
accomplish in their lives. And questioning why we favour severely compromised 
people over clever animals suggest where we place the value of being human." 
Now, while we may sympathise with Silver's point: " The grounding of the question 
asking whether profoundly impaired neonates should live tests how much we value 
human life itself as distinct from what individuals accomplish in their lives." As 
Tooley (1997:41) writes, " Most people would prefer to raise children who do not 
suffer from gross deformities or from severe physical, emotional, or intellectual 
handicaps.". 1 believe this to be correct. And to bridge the gap between being 
'different' in a world 'normal' is no easy task, neither for the parents who, for 
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example,' raise a handicapped child from birth nor for a person who later in life 
acquires disability or deformity. The emphasis on what an agent accomplishes in her 
life is certainly a worthy point. However, while no disrespect is meant to handicapped 
people, they (as a group) understandably tend to suffer, at minimum, a greater crises 
in self-identity (see: Pernick: 1997, Carey: 1989, Lefebvre: 1996, Strauss, 1988, 
Macgregor: 1974) than do those agents considered bodily 'normal'. 
Singer (1993b: 188-189) while not addressing specifically the differential point 
concerning what individuals accomplish in their lives says, (re: The discovery that 
Thalidomide administered to pregnant women as an aid to sleep resulted in abnormal 
births. Causally numerous abortions were requested by such women and subsequently 
the drug was withdrawn from the market and compensation given to effected women 
by the manufacturer): 
" It still may be objected that to replace either a fetus or a new-born infant is wrong 
because it suggests to disabled people living today that their lives are less worthy than 
the lives of people who are not disabled. Yet it is surely flying in the face of reality to 
deny that, on the average this is so. If we really believed that there is no reason to 
think that the life of a disabled person is as likely to be any worse than that of a 
normal person we would not have regarded this (Thalidomide) as a tragedy. The 
children would merely have been 'different' ... To believe this implies no disrespect at 
all for those who are lacking limbs; it simply recognises the difficulties they 
face ... Nor does this imply lack of respect or equal consideration for people with 
disabilities who are now living their lives in accordance with their own wishes." 
In writing this, Singer clearly identifies a real and stark reality; we do address those 
visibly normal, the handicapped, and the disabled in a different manner. We 'normal' 
do adore those 'normal' and thus become a part of the 'Tyranny of the Normal". 
In the story of Joseph Merrick, a man grossly deformed who lived in the 18th century; 
it is documented that he wrote an 'Autobiography' concerning his bodily 'difference.' 
Because of its detached style, it is contested whether he actually wrote it, or his 
exhibitor wrote it (Graham and Oehlschlaeger: 1992 12-15). In the introduction to the 
book Disability, Difference, Discrimination, (1998) written by Anita Silvers, David 
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Wassermann and Many B. Mahowald there is also a short narrative, written by 
Silvers, that concerns· the attitudes of society towards 'difference'. While time and 
space separate the players, a common tie remains. To illustrate this, we need only 
compare quotes from Joseph Merrick's (1874) 'Autobiography' (Howell and Ford: 
1980:183) with that of Anita Silvers (1998:1): 
Merrick: 
" ... 1 was sent about the town to see if I could procure work but being lame and 
deformed no one would employ me; when I went home for my meals, my step-mother 
used to say that 1 had not been to seek for work. I was taunted and sneered at ... b"eing 
deformed, people would not come to me to buy their wares. In consequence of my ill 
luck my life was again made misery to me ... but my deformity had grown to such a 
large extent that I could not move about the town without having a large crowd of 
people gather around me ... " 
Silvers: 
" ... a faculty colleague and I sat soaked by rain outside the local grocery store, 
waiting until some pedestrian happening by, was willing to walk in, find the manager, 
and convince him to un-padlock the only entrance to the store wide enough to admit 
our wheelchairs. The manager's reason for closing it shut? Other shoppers were 
using it to push shopping carts out to the parking lot, and sometimes further ... As you 
well know, we accept countless humiliations and repudiations daily and learn to 
ignore most of them, but then something like this happens .... What's wrong with these 
people? " 
What is it then to be a self captured in a disabled or deformed body? Such a body 
appears to be too much a body, too real, too corporeal: a body that stands in its own 
way. Viewing it in another dimension, no less reductive, a disabled body appears to 
lack something essential, something necessary to make it less identifiable; it seems 
too little a body, too lacking in something essential, deficient, not real enough. 
However, something remains lacking, for the 'body' itself seems to ~e in part a 
product of cultural construction. For example, as Donley and Buckley (1997:x) point 
out, mediasation of tlie 'ideal' body, the perfect body, has consequential results. The 
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rise in anorexics, the implied need for body reconstruction and perpetual 'youth' are 
particular contemporary, largely Western, cultural constructs. 
If there is such emphasis on the 'ideal' body by those possessing 'normal' bodies, 
then what perceptions of self are present in agents possessing deformed or disabled 
bodies? A disabled body presents a very threat to the very idea of a 'normal' body. 
And, as Porter (1997: xiv) writes, a disabled body informs current theoretical views of 
the body normal. Such approaches shields theory from its objects, it protects us from 
confronting the body in any other way than comparison and fascination with the 
unknown difference. 
In this section, I have shown that Singer does not argue for the killing of disabled 
humans who live their lives in accordance to their wishes. Did Merrick live his life in 
accordance to his wishes? Certainly, it appears that part of his life was lived as he 
wished. However, society, because of his deformity, largely defined the limits of his 
social interactions. Is it possible for deformed or disabled agents to have the 
opportunity to live their lives in accordance to their wishes? How precarious is the 
balance? 
The supposed threat of extinction of disabled agents represents an emotional response 
to an envi·sioned 'slippery slope'. However, as I have identified, their claims, while 
emotive, ought not to be blithely dismissed. Those 'bodily different'. call to us and we 
are obliged to heed their call. Their voices ask us to think about where we stand on 
issues such as bodily difference, of life and death, values, and theories of justice. They 
require us to ensure that the societies in which we live keep open and in public 
scrutiny, the myriad of moral issues surrounding tho,se visibly different. It is a valid 
call to all of us as moral agents to listen with a different ear to the voices of those 
disabled and visibly different. 
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NOTES TO SECTION II 
Supporting this, Godhagen (1996:23) writes: "The development in Germany well . 
before the Nazi's came to power of a virulent and violent' eliminationist' variant 
of anti-Semitism, which called for the elimination of Jewish influence or Jews 
themselves from German society. When the Nazi's did assume power, they found 
themselves the masters of a society already imbued with notions about Jews that 
were ready to be mobilised for the most extreme form of 'elimination' 
imaginable. " 
2 The Oregon Legislation: Death with Dignity Act (1994). "Under this Act, 
terminally ill adults are allowed to obtain lethal drugs from physicians in order to 
hasten death and escape unbearable suffering (Beauchamp: 1997: 41,n4)." 
3. "Choosing to Die" Morris refers to the case of Kenneth Bergstedt, one of four 
usually cited by disability activists to make this particular point. The other four 
cases concern David Rivlin, Larry McAfee, and Elizabeth Bouvia. All of these 
persons, quadriplegics, petitioned the courts for permission to remove life-
sustaining equipment (respirators in the case of the three men and artificial 
feeding in the case of Ms. Bouvia). In all these cases, the courts adhered to the line 
of argument taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cruzen and Casey, namely that 
individuals have the right to refuse invasive treatment even if it is life sustaining. 
Bergstedt and Rivlin had their ventilators turned off and died. McAfee did not, 
and Bouvia initiated but then abandoned an attempt to die from starvation. 
Legal and moral considerations of 'competence'. 
As Pence (1995: 29), points out, in legal and moral considerations concerning 
'competence' it is important to distinguish between different types of cases. These he 
groups broadly as: 
.,.. Those of competent adults (considering the extent of their illnesses and 
defining their rights to refuse/ accept further treatment) . 
.,.. The appointment of surrogates in cases in which a patient was, but no longer 
is competent. 
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).:- Surrogates for infants and child patients and judicial rulings on standards 
concerning those patients 'never competent' (i.e. severely handicapped new-borns 
and adults): 
The Bouvia case is of particular interest in that issues concerning the autonomy of 
competent adults requesting to die as well as social prejudices against disabled/ 
disfigured people are particularly entwined. Let us unpack these briefly. 
The Bouvia Case 
Elizabeth Bouvia was twenty-five years old and almost totally paralysed by cerebral 
palsy. In addition, she suffered from degenerative arthritis. She never had use of her 
legs, although she had some control over movement in her right hand, and enough 
control over her facial muscles to chew, swallow and speak. In September 1983, her 
father drove her to a general hospital in the U.S., where she was diagnosed as suicidal. 
She stated that she wanted "just to be left alone and not bothered by friends or family 
or anyone else and to ultimately starve to death"(quoted in Pence: 1996: 41). 
Hospitalised, her psychiatrist refused to allow her to starve herself to death. Bouvia 
then contacted the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and a reporter. Her case, 
the request to die, was accepted by a physician and lawyer as a pro bono (charity) 
case (ibid: 42). 
Autonomy 
To define or delimit actions considered 'self-regarding' John Stuart Mill in his essay 
On Liberty published in 1859 (1974: 12) applied his principle of harm. Mill's aim is to 
centre these source of actions on the individual thus, 'self-regarding', as opposed to 
values imposed on an individual by the state. In other words, the state should not 
impose on an individual an action or actions for the public good or even in his or her 
best interest. Conceiving autonomy as an individual right, then, essentially affords it 
to serve as a limitation against government interference. 
Question of competence 
The theoretical question in the Bouvia's case was not whether she was 'competent' or 
'incompetent'. Instead, as Pence (1994:55) identifies, the question would concern if 
there was any reason to question her competence. In other words, if there was no 
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room to doubt her competence, "then she would have a right to autonomy and she 
herself rather than anyone else could control the decision to die." The application of 
the principle of autonomy, in the case of Bouvia, was challenged by some, saying that 
she appeared to want to commit suicide only when in hospital, was 'unstable' and 
appeared to have 'some psychiatric problem' (ibid). 
Judicial Ruling: Bouvia Vs Superior Court (California Reporter, vol. 225, 1986: 296-
308) 
The judicial ruling in the case of Ms. Bouvia's stated, 
" ... (Moreover) if the right of the patient to. self-determination as to his own medical 
treatment is to have any meaning at all ... the right of a competent adult patient to 
refuse medical treatment is a constitutionally guaranteed right which must not be 
abridged .... In Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the quality of her life had been diminished to 
the point of hopekssness, uselessness, unenjoyability, and frustration. She, as the 
patient, lying helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her existence 
meaningless. She is not to be faulted for so concluding ... As all matters, lines must be 
drawn at some point, somewhere, but that decision must ultimately belong to the one 
whose life is the issue." 
Complex conditions for autonomous choice. 
This precedent was important in establishing a legal framework for competent adults 
to refuse medical treatment, thus affirming the value of autonomy. Yet, as Winkler 
(1993:358-359) identifies, in complex cases such as Bouvia's, "Particularly when the 
stakes are high, it is not enough merely to be competent and rational in a legal sense. 
It can be also critical whether the choice is authentic, in the sense of being consistent 
with one's own most important values and commitments." In this way, Winkler 
suggests that moral interpretation of cases informs 'the understanding of principles 
(such as autonomy) rather than principles determining the morality of cases.'(ibid). 
The question of autonomy was also raised although directed from a different source 
than one might have expected. Longmore (1987: 158), a disabled lawyer, said: 
" Given the lumping together of people with disabilities with those who are 
terminally ill, the blurring of voluntary assisted suicide and forced 'mercy' killing, 
and the oppressive conditions of social dis valuation and Isolation, blocked 
opportunities, economic deprivation, and enforced social powerlessness, talk of 
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'rational' or 'voluntary' suicide is simply Orwellian newspeak. The advocates of 
assisted suicide assume a non-existent autonomy. They offer an illusory self-
determination ". 
Longmore's claim is that the Bouvia case is exemplary of a deeper social problem. In . 
the creation of a despised 'abnormal' minority, American society (obsessed with 
idealising youth, beauty, fitness, and wealth) allows the disabled only one option 
consistent with the concept of autonomy: the decision they may take to die. It is in 
Longmore's critique of American society, placing greater value on the idealised 
'normal' to the sacrifice of values such as caring, erudition, and community that a 
question may be considered. Can the concept of 'autonomy', after all a social 
construct, be used prejudicially against, for example disabled minorities? 
After-word 
An 'after-word' concerning the Bouvia case is important to articulate. Quoting Pence 
(1995:47): 
" After her victory in court, Elizabeth Bouvia did ~ot kill herself. Some caring people 
had come forward and offered to help her die. These friends seen to have shown her 
that life could be worth living, and gradually she came to change her mind". This 
important point, present in many disability studies, was also raised in the story of 
Joseph Merrick, " the eye of others is where we seek the validation of our existence, 
and this is the yardstick by which we judge our self-worth. But universal approval, ar 
even acceptance is far less important than the consistent lave and admiration of a few 
consistent others" (Lefebvre: 1996: 63). 
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